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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Evidence before North Carolina Tribunals.
To the legalistic mind, strongly imbued with the common-law tradi-
tions governing court "procedure and legal proof, it may be often un-
acceptable that evidence can be "competent" before any tribunal without
complying with the strict rules long revered in court trials. That such
compliance is not only unnecessary, but highly undesirable before ad-
ministrative boards is the prevailing opinion currently expressed in
statutes, decisions, and legal journals generally.1 To insist upon the
technical rules of evidence in administrative hearings is, to the pro-
'See generally STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE (1933); 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§4a-f; Stephan, The
Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by the Rules of Evidence(1939) 18 ORE. L. REv. 229.
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ponents of this view, inconsistent both with the nature of sucfi tribunals
and the causes which prompted their rise and promise their continued
growth.2 The majority of these rules, they insist, were designed to
guide the untrained jury through possible sources of error and, at most,
secure to judicial inquiry a probability rather than a guaranty of truth.
On the other hand, the ability to discriminate between reliable and un-
reliable offers of proof is a fundamental tool in the expert equipment of
administrative -officers and, in fact, is the natural result of constant ex-
perience in hearing the same limited class of controversy s Indeed, the
inability of common-law courts, hampered by too frequent disputes over
technical procedural and evidential tactics, to provide that expeditious
settlement of complex social and commercial problems which modern
society demands, contributed greatly to the rise of administrative boards
-composed not alone of legal experts, but also of professional and busi-
ness men, whose task it is to decide summarily according to the merits
of a case and not according to "procedural etiquette". 4 To enforce
strictly the jury-trial rules would preclude litigants from themselves
placing their cases before the boards and thus enjoying the full benefit
of their remedy without the frequently prohibitive aid of counsel. 5
Their view is a challenge to the law and lawyers to keep abreast the-
times, to put their own house in order, perhaps to justify their continued
existence as socially adequate institutions.0 Yet these arguments are
'1 WIGMoax, EvIDNCE (3d ed. 1940) §4b; Riedl, Should Rules of Evidence
Govern Fact-Finding Boardsf (1938) 23 MAQ. L. REv. 13, 19; Ross, The Ap-
plicability of Common Law Rides of Evidence in Proceedings Before Workmen's
Compensation Commissions (1923) 36 HA~v. L. REV. 263, 296; Stephan, supra note
1, at 230-237. '1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) 35, 36.
" "Many courts would gain in modesty by reflecting upon the fact that it was
their own deficiencies which led the whole country in one sweeping emphatic move-
ment to set up specialized administrative tribunals to handle the complex problem
of administering justice in great specialized branches of human activity." Hanft,
Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. REv. 12, 40.
'Admittedly, administrative hearings 'have made possible serious inroads on
lucrative sources of practice; but so long as attorneys exclude from their repertoire
a skill in informally -presenting cases, their services may become even less attractive
to client and tribunal alike. A familiar consequence of this failure to comprehend
the full significance of a specialized mode of trial, is reported as follows: "Of
course many private attorneys, unaccustomed to certain novel variations in admin-
istrative procedure, will doubtless continue to protest that they are denied their
'day in court,' since the rules of evidence employed in ordinary judicial proceedings
are not strictly adhered to by the NLRB. As a matter of administrative practice,
NLRB attorneys have found it expedient in most cases to follow court rules of
evidence in order to avoid interminable bickerings and delays on the part of em-
ployer counsel." Davey, Separation of Functions and the National Labor Relations
Board (1940) 7 U. oF CHn. L. RV. 328, 343, n. 53. Attorneys may find this a
hollow victory.
"That many rules of evidence may have outlived theif usefulness even in court
trials seems to have been the motivation of many recent efforts, to t'clean house?
on the part of bar associations and others. See Report of the Committee on Im-
provements in the Law of Evidence (1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 570. Tentative Draft
No. 1 of the American Law Institute's Code of Evidence'was submitted at the 1940
annual meeting.
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not without their partially countervailing answers. Clearly, the jury-
trial rules of evidence are the tested product of a long experience with
judicial fact-finding; and a great many there are that have established
themselves as indispensable aids to truth, whatever the nature of the
fact-finding body. There are those, too, which are fundamental in the
protection of substantive rights, wherever an issue is tried.7 Further-
more, administrative officers are too frequently only theoretically expert
-politically appointed and politically influenced, prone to decide on
surmise and conjecture. The common-law rules of evidence become
another device in the effort to restrict their too free discretion and to
secure to litigants a justice according to law.8
Behind these conflicting views lies a common purpose-to adapt a
time-honored science of proof to a new and growing system of trial,
utilizing the advantages of both, but retaining the faults of neither.
Naturally, reasonable reliability and certainty of evidence are desiderata
whether the investigation is by an administrative body or court; and
the character of evidence admitted in each forum should therefore be
expected to be similar, but need not be identical. Necessarily following
the paths of least resistance, the prevailing judicial and legislative atti-
tudes are expressed in varying degrees of compromise.
A survey of the statutes creating the various North Carolina boards
discloses a lack of definite policy in regard to evidence,9 which is con-
sistent with the haphazard treatment commonly accorded administrative
procedure by our legislature.10 Since none prescribe particular rules
which must be enforced or may be violated, they may be examined only
to determine broadly whether in each instance the juty-trial rules are
essential or may be relaxed. A majority of the statutes ignore the ques-
tion entirely; others treat it only by implication; a select few refer to
it expressly. If, then, the policies which will finally be evolved are for
the most part conjectural, conjecture in this field is not entirely without
dearly discernible guides. Maley v. Thontaille Furniture Co.1 is a
landmark case in North Carolina and, although immediately concerned
7 "But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative
the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are
asserted or defended." Interstate Com. Comm. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 227 U. S.
88, 93, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 187, 57 L. ed. 431, 434 (1913).
' STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94-103; Collins, The Extent to Which
Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by the Rules of Evidence (1938) 12 CONN.
B. J. 278, 282.
'The permissible use by an important tribunal of its own knowledge and judicial
notice, a matter not within the scope of this note, is discussed in Hanft, Utilities
Commissions as Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 12.
1' Lack of legislative care in drafting administrative statutes in North Carolina
has been frequently decried. Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under
Licensing Statutes (1938) 17 N. C. L. Rav. 1; Hoyt, Shaping Judicial Review of
Administrative Tribunals (1937) 16 N. C. L. Ray. 1.1'214 N. C. 589,-200 S. E. 438 (1939).
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with evidence admissible in hearings before the Industrial Commission,
contains the following language which is probably of general application:
"The Industrial Commission is an administrative board, with quasi-
judicial functions. The manner in which it transacts its business is a
proper subject of statutory regulation and need not necessarily conform
to court procedure except where the statute so requires,12 or where, in
harmony with the statute, or where it fails to speak.-the Court of last
resort, in order to preserve the essentials of justice and the principles of
due process of law, shall consider rules similar to those observed in
strictly judicial investigations in courts of law to be indispensable or
proper."' 3
Furthermore, consistent with the fundamental conception that procedure
before administrative tribunals should be informal, authorities elsewhere
agree that relaxation of the jury-trial rules should be expected where
(1) the statute does not expressly require them;
(2) the statute empowers the board to enact its own rules of pro-
cedure, or provides that procedure "shall be as summary and
simple as reasonably may be," etc.
(3) the statute provides expressly that the board need not be bound
"by common law or statutory rules of evidence," etc.1 4
Supporting clues may be found in the nature of the tribunal examined,
the practicability of enforcing strict rules therein, and the extent of pro-
tection which is afforded by the method of appeal provided in each
instance. Thus, it is hoped fairly to anticipate the general judicial atti-
tude in North Carolina. Definite limitations to a policy of relaxation
are found in few decisions, so far apparently confined to workmen's
compensation cases.
I
On one extreme, the legislature has provided that in hearings before
the Utilities Commission "the rules of evidence shall be the same as in
civil actions, except as provided by this chapter."' 5 Clearly, the inten-
tion is to require a standard of proof equivalent to that obtaining in
jury trials; and, presumably, the court would be compelled to so hold.
In practice, however, the commission has apparently condoned and per-
haps even encouraged a more liberal policy.'6 Although violating the
Italics supplied.
"Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N. C. 589, 594, 200 S. E. 438, 441(1939).
"' This summary is substantially in accord with that outlined in 1 WIGMORE,
EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §4c. See also STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 86 (with
cited cases). Cases and statutes re workmen's compensation are reviewed in Ross,
supra note 2, at 263.
' N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1093.
STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77 contains the following letter received
by the author in answer to a questionnaire sent the North Carolina commission
regarding its practice in receiving evidence: "Our statute requires that the same
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
express command of the statute, this practice should not be condemned;
for not only is the North Carolina requirement out of line with that
most commonly applicable to utilities commissions elsewhere, 17 but also
the extensive review provided on appeal from the North Carolina com-
mission seems to render it unnecessary. The supreme court has inter-
preted the statute18 as allowing a jury trial de novo on question of fact,
and a hearing before a judge. on questions of law, on appeal to the
superior court.19 A complete new trial is manifestly adequate to correct
any errors in the admission of evidence below,20 and an erroneous ruling
which affects substantial rights of a litigant may be found appealable
as an error of law.21 This tribunal, being one of the most active, has a
peculiar claim to the advantages of a flexible procedure; and since some
relaxation of the jury-trial rules is undoubtedly beneficial and desired
by the officers comprising the commission, North Carolina stands to
profit by a liberal amendment.
In proceedings to revoke or suspend the licenses of dentists,2 2 mouth
hygienists, 23 and osteopaths, 24 the charges must be heard "upon com-
petent evidence". Conceivably, the court might construe the word
"competent" not in its technical sense but as having a peculiar signif-
icance for administrative tribunals. That neither this word, nor any
similar expression is used to describe the evidence admissible before any
of the other myriad North Carolina licensing boards, of like or different
rules of evidence shall be enforced in the court of the Corporation Commission[now Utilities Commission] as are enforced in the Superior Courts, but our Com-
mission has never adhered strictly to this requirement when the ends of justice
demanded a more liberal policy. We apply a great many rules, such as the rule
against hearsay testimony and the rule as to secondary evidence, but we admit
affidavits where the adverse party has an opportunity to answer them and petitions
from the people without requirement of proof of signatures. We recall no specific
instance -where the omission to apply the rules of evidence has operated against
obtaining an accurate understanding of the facts. Many petitioners before our
Commission come without lawyers and where there are not lawyers on both sides
we generally let down the bars, and accept any evidence which we think reliable
and that can assist us in arriving at the facts. In such case we are sure that apply-
ing the strict rules of evidence would greatly handicap the parties in presenting
their case and handicap us in arriving at the facts."
"' Statutes compiled in STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9-15; 1 WGMoaa,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §4c, n. 68.
'IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§1097, 1098.
" Corporation Comm. v. Seaboard A. L. & Sou. Ry., 161, N. C. 270, 76 S. E.
554 (1912); Utilities Comm. v. Carolina Scenic Coach Co., 218 N. C. 233, 10 S. E.(2d) 824 (1940). This type review is criticized in Hoyt, loc. cit. supra note 10.
20 STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 40, 87 (and cited cases) ; Collins, supra
note 8, at 284.
-" "As a legal conclusion, no one will deny that in any judicial proceeding the
competency of testimony offered in support of or against any material fact is, a
question of law." Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 467, 148 N. W. 247, 248
(1914). Under a relaxed policy violation of technical rules should not be so
reviewable in absence of a clear showing of prejudice.
22 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6649(21).2 31 Id. §6649(c) (procedure made same as for dentists).
2 1 Id. §6708(a).
[Vol. 19
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character, is strong indication that its use here was inadvertent. Since
the jury-trial rules, as such, are not expressly required, some measure
of relaxation could thereby be achieved.25  The state board of dental
examiners is granted the power to make necessary regulations, "not
inconsistent" with the article, regarding "any matter" referred to' there,
and "for the purpose of facilitating the transaction of business by the
... board."- 6 Apparently the board is thus permitted to enact its own
rules of procedure; and should the court adopt the suggested construc-
tion of "competent", this power, generally regarded as impliedly sanc-
tioning an independence of the jury-trial rules,2 7 would furnish authority
for a liberal practice in hearings involving both dentists and mouth
hygienists. 28  Although a like power is not granted to the state board
of osteopathic examination and registration, there seem to be no char-
acteristics peculiar to that board which justify the application of differ-
ent evidence rules. The hearing on appeal from the dental board must
conform to that employed in consent references ;29 whereas a jury trial
is apparently proper on review of the osteopathic board.30 For both,
however, the record formed at the administrative hearing shall consti-
tute the record on appeal. While the review is not so complete as that
afforded on appeal from the Utilities Commission, it appears adequate
to correct any errors which may have affected substantial rights of the
parties and to discourage appeals upon purely technical grounds. Here,
again, a liberal practice would seem more beneficial than dangerous.
In fact, some modification of the jury-trial rules is inescapable, since
to enforce them would necessitate an extensive legal education for the
dentists and osteopaths comprising the boards.
A uniform procedure is provided3 l for the revocation or suspension
by the appropriate tribunals of licenses issued to electrical contractors,
contractors, accountants, embalmers; chiropodists, verterinarians, bar-
bers, engineers and land surveyors, cosmetologists, tile contractors,
plumbing and heating contractors, boiler inspectors, 2 and photographers.
"' See note 14, supra.
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6649(7).
2, See note 14, supra.
28 See note 23, supra. The State Board of Dental Examiners is the licensing
board for mouth hygienists. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6649(a).
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6649(20).
" Id. §6708(a) ; State v. Carroll, 194 N. C. 37, 139 S. E. 339 (1927) (general
reference in statute to "right of appeal" entitles parties to jury trial).
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6604(1)-(8). The uniform statute is re-
viewed in A Survey of Statutory Changes it; North Carolina in 1939 (1939) 17
N. C. L. Rnv. 327, 331. The author concludes that the statute "should prove an
advantageous first step in bringing some order into the chaos of administrative
procedure under North Carolina statutes."
2, §6604(8) of the uniform act provides that "nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to remove any additional procedural requirement . . . provided in the
Jaw creating either of the boards named. . .". For the purposes of this note, the
only additional requirement of importance is found in N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie
19411
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Since substantially similar procedure is required in hearings before the
Council of tho North Carolina State Bar,3 3 the statutes may be consid-
ered together in determining their probable effect on the rules of evidence.
To begin with, the jury-trial rules are not required by any express pro-
vision. Furthermore, each tribunal is given power to enact rules and
regulations governing its procedure,84 which procedure must conform
"as near as may be" to that "provided by law for hearings before
referees in compulsory references". 35 On the face of the statutes, there-
fore, substantial relaxation is apparently authorized.30 The matter is
complicated, however, by a requirement in C. S. 576 that "trial by
referees shall be conducted in the same manner as a trial by the court."37
Arguably, the legislature did not intend to incorporate such an all-
inclusive provision into administrative procedural requirements, being
perhaps unaware of the resulting effect upon the rules of evidence. That
tfiis is not unlikely is largely substantiated by its usual disregard of
evidence in licensing and other administrative statutes. Furthermore,
the remainder of C. S. 576 relates only to the power to allow amend-
ments, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to grant adjournments,
and other attributes of a similar nature common to courts, leaving un-
mentioned the character of proof admissible. Moreover, except for the
Council of the State Bar, it is inconceivable that successful administra-
tion of a requirement so exacting could be demanded or expected from
boards comprised, as are these, of business and professional men,
strangers to the law. Once the difficulty interjected by C. S. 576 is
hurdled, a further argument for relaxation may be-based on analogy to
certain incidents of the appeal which is allowed on referees' reports. In
both instances, a jury trial may be obtained in the superior court on
the evidence taken below ;38 but many North Carolina decisions are to
the effect that a referee's finding of facts, once approved by the trial
court, are not subject to review on appeal to the supreme court if there
is any competent evidence to support them.39 If the analogy is sound,
1939) §7312(10), which provides that on appeal to the board of boiler rules from
revocation of inspectors' commissions by the Commissioner of Labor, the decision
of the board shall be final.
"N. C, CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §215(11).
'Id. §215(11) (Bar Act); id. §6604(8) (Uniform Act).
"Id. §215(11) (Bar Act); id. §6604(1) (Uniform Act).
' See note 14, supra.
"7 Provisions concerning references and procedure before referees are found in
N. C. CoDE ANN, (Michie, 1939) §§573-579, 1421(a).
"IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6604(4) (Uniform Act); id. §215(11)
(Bar Act) ; id. §573 (references). In references, a jury trial on review is a right
of which a party may avail himself by timely motion. Most often apparently,
review is before the judge.
" "It is settled by all the decisions on the subject, with none to the contrary,
that the findings of fact, made by a referee and approved by the trial judge, are
not subject to review on appeal, if they are supported by any competent evidence."
(Vol. 19
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therefore, abundant authority would sanction the admission of tech-
nically incompetent evidence in hearings before these tribunals, so long
as such evidence was not the sole basis for the findings. 40 However
an enlightened attitude must still be encouraged on review in the superior
court.
II
Why the many remaining licensing boards should have been denied
unform procedure under C. S. 6604(1) is not apparent, nor is it made
so by characteristics peculiar to any of them.41 The procedure provided
in each statute varies radically from-board to board,-but one feature is
common to all-the jury-trial rules of evidence are not required by any
express provisions. Also in some instances, power is granted to enact
rules and regulations "necessary to enforce the provisions of [the]
article",42 or "necessary and proper . . . for the performance of its
duties", 43 or "necessary for the regulation of its proceedings". 44 The last
mentioned provision seems expressly to empower the board to provide its
own mode of procedure; and it is .arguable that a similar power is im-
plied'where the other type provisions are employed. Therefore, general
authority, supported by the dicta in- the Maley case, 45 would authorize
a policy of relaxation before all the remaining boards here considered,
particularly in those instances where the tribunal may enact rules of pro-
cedure.46 Similarly, many North Carolina tribunals, not performing
strictly licensing functions, are free of any requirement expressly retain-
ing the technical rules of evidence. Hearings before the State Bank
Kenney v. Balsairt Hotel Co., 194 N. C. 44, 45, 138 S. E. 349, 350 (1927); Holder
v. Home Mortgage Co., 214 N. C. 128, 134, 198 S. E. 589, 592 (1938) (". . there
must be some competent evidence to support the findings of the referee or the
court below."); see also Dumas v. Morrison, 175 N. C. 431, 435, 95 S. E. 775,
777 (1918) ; Anderson v. McRae, 211 N. C. 197, 199, 189 S. E. 639, 640 (1937) ;
Pack v. Katzin, 215 N. C. 233, 235, 1 S. E. (2d) 566, 568 (1939) ("While some
of the testimony in the form in which it was offered might be subject to criticism,
there was ample evidence free from valid objection tending to support the findings
and conclusions of the referee.")
" Under N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §8081 (ppp) findings of fact by the
Industrial Commission are made "conclusive and binding". The court has re-
peatedly held that such findings are conclusive in both supreme) and superior courts
if supported by competent evidence. Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N. C. 500, 163 S. E.
569 (1932) (except as to jurisdictional facts) ; Perdue v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 205 N. C. 730, 172 S. E. 396 (1934); Reed v. Lavender Bros., 206 N. C.
898, 172 S. E. 877 (1934).
"Undoubtedly a few tribunals have escaped this writer's attention. See lists of
N. C. licensing boards compiled by Hanft and H-amrick loc. cit. sW'ra note 10."
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5126(g) (re licensing collectors by the
Insurance Commissioner).
"Id. §6697 (Board of Examiners in Optometry) ; id. §6714 (Board of Chiro-
practic Examiners).
" Id. §6654 (Board of Pharmacy).
" See note 13, supra. ' See note 14, supra.
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Commission,47 Revenue Commissioner,48 State Board of Assessment,49
State Board of Alcoholic Control, 50 State Highway and Public Works
Commission,51 Commissioner of Agriculture,5 2 and Board of Commis-
sioners of Navigation and Pilotage5" may, therefore, be conducted
under, a liberal practice.
From many of these boards, however, no appeal at all is provided ;64
and from one, at least, the right is expressly denied."5 From others,
review may be obtained before a judge," or, in some instances, before
a jury57 in the superior court, sometimes confined to the record com-
piled below58 and sometimes not. Yet the frequently limited scope of
'"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §221(o) (commission empowered to enact
rules and regulations as to hearings).
"SId. §7880(153),(155),(156) (income tax); §7880(156)r(sales tax); §7880(156)mm(gift tax); §7880(156)zzl(intangibles tax); §7880(189) (commissioner
given power to enact rules and regulations "as may be needful to enforce" act).
,Id. §7971(108),(109),(162) (may prescribe "needful and proper" rules).
" Id. §3411(68). But no hearing is required for revocation or denial of permits
to sell to county liquor stores. That perhaps none is necessary, because "state
agencies are engaged in the purchase of goods and may do so on their own terms",
is suggested in A Survey oA Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937 (1937)
15 N. C. L. Rav. 321, 328. Certainly on the same principle, the strict rules of
evidence should be relaxed wherever a 'hearing involves solely the granting or
denying of governmental benefits.5 N. C. CODD ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3846(v) 1 (settlement of contractors' claims
against commission). Reviewed in A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Caro.
lina in 1939 (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 327, 340. The appeal being the same as
provided in workmen's compensation cases under N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§8081(ppp), a similar policy of relaxation should obtain here. (See note 40,
supra.)2 Many occasions arise for hearings before the Commissioner of Agriculture.
See, for example, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4738 (violation of regulations
concerning commercial feeding stuffs; commissioner may prescribe rules for con-
duct of hearings). Also, N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §4745 (violations *of
regulations concerning stock and poultry tonics) ; id. §4768(20) (foods, drugs, and
cosmetics).
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6943(k). Procedure must conform "as
nearly as may be to procedure provided by law in courts of justices of the peace."
Since appeals (to the superior courts of New Hanover or Brunswick counties) are
as "appeals on judgments of justices of the peace", a jury trial de novo is evidently
intended; so relaxation of the jury-trial rules of evidence would hardly be danger-
ous. (See note 20, supra.)VtN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§4985-4998 (Board of Architectural
Examination and Registration) ; id. §§4999-5003 (revocation of auctioneers' licenses
by Insurance Commissioner) ; id. §§5185-5193 (building and loan associations' li-
censes by Insurance Commissioner) ; id. §5205 (land and loan associations subject
to same regulations as building and loan associations) ; id. §5237-5241 (supervision
of credit unions) ; id. §§6729-6739 (Board of Nurse Examiners) ; id. §§6650-6686(e)
(Board of Pharmacy); id. §§6710-6728 (Board of Chiropractic Examiners).85N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6618 (Board of Medical Examiners).
For example, id. §6300 (appeal from revocation of agents' licenses by In-
surance Commissioner to "any judge of the superior court of Wake County. .. ").
" Often, as in revocation of licenses issued to employment agencies by Commis-
si6ner of Labor under N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7312(q), the statute
merely refers generally to the "right of appeal". The court has held in State v.
Carroll, 194 N. C. 37, 138 S. E. 339 (1927) that such general reference entitles the
parties to a jury trial.
"For example, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5126(f) (appeal from In-
surance Commissioner on revocation of collectors' permits).
[Vol. 19
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review presents no conclusive obstacle. Even where no appeal is avail-
able, the common-law writ of certiorari may be employed to correct any
arbitrary or illegal action ;5 and a decision wholly unsupported by ev-
idence may constitute such reviewable error.60 As before mentioned,
where the appeal is confined to questions of law, flagrant violations of
the more fundamental legal rules may be reviewed.61 Here again, lay
commissioners cannot be expected to enforce rigidly the formal rules of
evidence.
III
Representing the clearest intention to relax the jury-trial rules, the
North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provides: ". . . the
conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with rules pre-
scribed by the commission for determining the rights of the parties,
whether or not such rules conform to common law or statutory rules of
evidence and technical rules of procedure" ;62 and again, to remove all
possible doubt: "... The commission shall not be bound by common law
or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of pro-
cedure but shall conduct hearings in such manner as to ascertain the sub-
stantial rights of the parties."'6  The Workmen's Compensation Act,
after empowering the Industrial Commission to enact necessary rules,
specifies that ". . . processes and procedure under this article shall be
as summary and simple as reasonably may be", 64 and also that "The
commission ... shall hear the parties... and shall determine the dispute
in a summary manner."65 The findings of fact by both commissions are
made conclusive on appeal.66
Only the workmen's compensation provision has been construed by
the court, and the resulting principle, broadly stated, is that the admis-
sion of incompetent evidence before the Industrial Commission will not
require the reversal of an award if there is other competent evidence
"See Board of Commissioners v. Smith, 110 N. C. 417, 418, 14"S. E. 972(1892) ; Taylor v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 84, 85, 87 S. E. 98f, 983 (1916) ; Walls v.
Stricdland 174 N. C. 298, 301, 93 S. E. 857, 858 (1917). Accord: State v. Scott,
182 N. C. 865, 879, 109 S. E. 789, 797 (1921). For pertinent discussion see Note
(1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 609.
" See Note (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 609, 613 (and cited cases).
" See note 21, supra. A suitable method of review to accompany a policy of
relaxation is suggested in note 97, infra.
"'Italics supplied. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §8052(6).
"f Id. §8052(11).
6Italics supplied. 1fq. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §8081 (jjj).
"Id. §8081(nnn).
6 See note 40, supra (re Industrial Commission). C. S. §8052(6) (re Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission) seems to have substantially incorporated the
judicial interpretation of the workmen's compensation provision as follows: "...
,the findings of the commission as to the facts, if there is evidence to support it,
and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of [the]
court shall be confined to questions of law."
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sustaining it.0 7 The view is one of compromise. The court is willing
to relax, but not abandon, the technical rules. It sanctions the admnission
of incompetent evidence, but evidence which conforms to standards of
proof required in court trials must be the basis of the commission's
findings. Although the wording of the Unemployment Compensation
Act would appear to permit a greater degree of relaxation, the majority
of cases throughout the country indicates that substantially the same
effect will be attributed to it.08 Hence, in reviewing the cases to deter-
mine definite limitations to the North Carolina policy, a similar result
may be anticipated here, bearing in mind the possibility of a more lib-
eral treatment if and when the unemployment compensation provision
comes before the court.69
The North Carolina cases have largely involved the admission of
hearsay testimony and, specifically, declarations of deceased persons as
to the cause of their injuries. In Maley v. Thoniasville Furniture
Co.,7 0 the claim was based upon death from blood poisoning as the re-
sult of an injury allegedly sustained by decedent while operating a trim
saw in defendant employer's plant. Other than testimony based on
what deceased had told witnesses, the only evidence indicating an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment was the testimony of a
fellow-employee that he had seen deceased on the day of the alleged
injury operating the saw, his arm freshly bleeding. Sustaining the
award of compensation, the court, while considering the hearsay as
properly in the case since unobjected to at the first hearing, expressly
states "that the findings and award will not be disturbed because of the
presence in the case of hearsay testimony where there is other com-
petent evidence, of sufficient probative force, upon which to base the
findings."171 The circumstantial evidence relating to the injury, consid-
ered alone sufficient to sustain the award, constituted the "other com-
"Maley v. Thomnasville Furniture Co., 214 N. C. 589, 20D S. E. 438 (1939);
MacRae v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 217 N. C. 769, 9 S. E. (2d)
595 (1940).
"Compilation of statutes and decisions in 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)§4c, n. 70, n. 71. See also Ross, supra note 2, at 276, 285 (decisions under each type
statute reviewed). Where a policy of relaxation obtains, decisions may be classified
roughly into two categories: (1) incompetent evidence cannot constitute the sole
support of a finding; (2) findings may be based solely on incompetent evidence if
reasonably probative. Either view may result under either' type statute, the decisive
factor being the judicial attitude in the particular jurisdicti n.
"' Since the statute expressly obviates the necessity of applying the "common
law or statutory -rules of evidence", the court could hardly be expected to adopt a
less liberal policy. Indeed, where courts under similarly worded statutes have re-
quired findings to be supported by only soine competent evidence, the decisions have
been considered as "in spite of [the] statute". See Report of the Conminittee on
Administrative Agencies and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 422.
'0 214 N. C. 589, 200 S. E. 43& (1939). "1rd. at 595, 200 S. E. at 442.
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petent evidence" here, and was properly to be corroborated or explained
by hearsay.
A somewhat similar case is Plyler v. Charlotte Country Club,72
where the claim was based upon death from blood poisoning as the
result of an injury allegedly sustained by deceased while caddying at
defendant employer's golf course. The evidence established that de-
ceased was not injured when he returned from his first assigned round
of the afternoon; and the only indication that he again acted as caddy
that day was his father's testimony that, on calling for him, he was
seen near the caddy house carrying a bag, walking on the side of his
foot, and that his toe was bleeding when he came to the car, the latter
point being substantiated by a brother of deceased. Over defendant's
objection evidence that deceased stated he was injured while caddying
was admitted. Holding all plaintiff's evidence insufficient to support an
award, the court emphasizes that findings must be based on some com-
petent evidence, and states further: "It must not only appear by
competent evidence that the injury was received in the course of the
employment, but also that it arose out of the employment as well. Hear-
say evidence is not competent to establish either fact." 73 Under the
court's view, the circumstantial evidence, although competent, was not
adequately probative of either fact; in the Maley case, stronger circum-
stantial proof established both. Thus, the distinction between the two
cases is based alone upon the sufficiency of the competent evidence
adduced, and the presence of hearsay was a decisive factor in neither. 7 4
Brown v. Asheville Ice Co.75 and Johnson v. Charlotte Bagging Co.76
are earlier cases involving declarations of deceased employees which bear
out the same general proposition. In the former such evidence alone
was held insufficient to support a finding ;7 in the latter, where the court
found sufficient supporting evidence, admission of the incompetent ev-
2 214 N. C. 453, 199 S. E. 622 (1938).
73 Id. at 455, 199 S. E. at 623.
7' The Maley case establishes the rule that the hearsay will be considered in the
case unless objected to during the stage of the proceedings at which it was intro-
duced. If objection is not timely, therefore, otherwise incompetent hearsay might
become the sole basis for a finding, although the point is apparently not squarely
presented by a North Carolina case. In this decision (214 N. C. 589, 596, 200 S. E.
438, 442 (1939)) it is said: "The principle on which hearsay evidence is excluded
by rules of evidence relates to its competency, not to its relevancy. That it has
probative force is unquestioned and there are numerous exceptions to the rule of
exclusion." In the Plyler case (214 N. C. 453, 456, 199 S. E. 622, 623 (1938))
however, the court says: "That hearsay evidence is not admissible and has no
probative force in the proof of an essential fact at issue is so well established that.
we need not discuss the same or cite authorities in support thereof."
7- 203 N. C. 97, 164 S. E. 631 (1932).
"203 N. C. 579, 166 S. E. 586 (1932).
"A similar well-known case is Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435,
113 N. E. 507 (1916).
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idence was not reversible error.78  These decisions are in accord with
authority elsewhere. 70
Numerous other decisions, not always clear as to the type of evidence
involved, contain language consistent with the general rule that findings
must be supported by competent evidence.80 However, since the North
Carolina decisions to date are not very comprehensive, two questions
remain unanswered by precise holdings: (1) Are there any types of
incompetent evidence the admission of which may be considered suffi-
ciently prejudicial to require reversal although there is other competent
evidence on the point? (2) Are there any types of evidence, incom-
petent before a court of law, which could be the sole basis for a finding?
An affirmative answer to the former is suggested by the recent case
of Logan v. Johnson8 l in which, along with other evidence tending to
establish the extent of claimant's disability, a doctor was permitted to
base his testimony in part upon an unsigned letter, said to have been a
report received by him from another doctor. This letter was included
in the record on appeal, and its use assigned as error by defendant.
Although unnecessary to the decision, the court concluded its opinion
as follows: "As the case goes back to the Industrial Commission it is
appropriate to say that even though there may be other testimony to the
"' Indicating a commissioner's attitude toward the value of relaxing the common-
law rules, the court quotes the following remark of the hearing commissioner:
"... I know it [hearsay] is not competent, but I am going to admit it for what it
might be worth, in helping me find the facts, give plaintiff an exception." Johnson
v. Charlotte Bagging Co., 203 N. C 579, 582, 166 S. E. 586, 587 (1932).
See compilation of cases in Ross, loc. cit. supra note 2. See Stephan, sdpra
note 1, at 243 where it is said, "It is unreasonable to suspect a general rule that
deceased, before death, will make false statements so that relief may accrue to his
family. If this type of hearsay evidence is excluded, the legislative aims are to
such an extent defeated." But see Report of the Committee on Administrative
Agencies and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. Rxp. 407, 423 where Stephan's reason-
ing is deemed "superficial"; but the report recognizes the movement to relax the
rule by "admitting statements of a person since deceased, if made in good faith and
before the commencement of litigation, and upon personal knowledge of the
declarant". This relaxation, applicable as well to court trials, was recommended
in Report of the Committee on Improvements In the Law of Evidence (1938) 63
A. B. A. REP. 570, 584. Also see Ross, supra note 2, at 298.
" In Russell v. Western Oil Co., 206 N. C. 341, 174 S. E. 101 (1934) and Carl-
ton v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N. C. 655, 188 S. E. 77 (1936) findings were held
properly supported by accident reports subnmitted by employers to the Industrial
Commission. In the former case such report was considered an admission, in the
latter a declaration against interest, and thus competent under an exception to
the hearsay rule. Accord: Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 148 N. W.
247 (1914). But see Ross, supra note 2, at 280 (" ... it is doubtful whether such
a report is an admission . . ."). Other cases: Reed v. Lavender Bros.. 206 N. C.
898, 172 S. E. 877 (1934); Hildebrand v. McDowell Furniture Co., 212 N. C. 100,
193 S. E. 294 (1937) ; Lassiter v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 N. C. 227, 1 S. E.(2d) 542 (1939); Porter v. Noland Co., Inc., 215 N. C. 724, 2 S. E. (2d) 853(1939); Tindall v. American Furniture Co., 216 N. C. 306, 4 S. E. (2d) 894(1939); Blassingame v. Southern Asbestos Co., 217 N. C. 233, 7. S. E. (2d) 478(1940); MacRae v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 217 N. C. 769, 9 S. E. (2d)
595 (1940) ; McGill v. Lumberton, 218 N. C. 586, 11 S. E. (2d) 873 (1940).81218 N. C. 200, 10 S. E. (2d) 653 (1940).
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same effect,82 the unsigned copy of [the] letter ... to which defendant
excepted, is incompetent, and has no place in the record and evidence in
the case." 83 If taken to mean that reversal might have resulted on this
point alone, the suggestion is contra to the established North Carolina
rule, unless a peculiar prejudicial effect, not common to the types of
incompetent evidence previously considered by the court, is to be at-
tributed to this use of an unsigned letter. But, of course, the point is
not squarely presented, and perhaps the court was merely indicating
what it considered a more prudent procedure. An earlier case, Citizens
Bank and Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co.,84 suggests the correctness of
the latter interpretation. There plaintiff's witness, who had been con-
victed of the employee's murder, refused to answer any material ques-
tions on cross-examination; whereupon, the commissioner ordered the
transcript of testimony given by the witness in the criminal proceeding
to be included in the record of the hearing, and denied defendant's
motion to strike both the testimony given on direct examination and the
transcript. The supreme court reversed the award of compensation,
but in emphasizing that plaintiff's case was supported only by this ob-
jectionable testimony, strongly implied that the presence of competent
evidence would have rendered reversal unnecessary.8 5 This being true,
it represents a significant concession to administrative procedure. It is
difficult to imagine an admittedly erroneous practice more fraught with
the possibility of prejudice than the direct denial of -the jealously
guarded right of cross-examination. Certainly, the use of an unsigned
letter is no more so.. A definite answer to the: question must, of course,
await appropriate cases. However, so long as the court insists that each
finding be supported by a residuum of competent evidence and is dis-
creet in its application of the rule,88 severe infractions of the jury-trial
rules may be safely tolerated, provided no practice is sanctioned whose
advantages are butweighed by the dangers of a failing confidence in the
Industrial Commission as a tribunal-of fair play.
The second question, whether some types of legally incompetent
evidence might be considered proper as the sole support of a finding,
becomes vitally important. Unless perhaps such evidence were received
2Italics supplied.
Logan v. Johnson, 218 N. C. 200, 203, 10 S. E. (2d) 653, 655 (1940).84 216 N. C. 432, 5 S. E. (2d) 318 (1939).
Id. at 435, 5 S. E. (2d) at 321.
88 Given a proper case, the rule may become dangerous if the court looks only
to see if there is a "scintilla!' of competent evidence to support the commission's
findings; yet to search the complete record for a preponderance is undesirable.
Hoyt, supra note 10, at 7 aptly suggests ". . . that the administrative findingi of
fact should stand unless unsupported by evidence or unless arbitrary or capricious."
Under a statute so worded, the court might review questions of law and "look into
the record if there was something seriously wrong with the findings of fact, with-
out requiring the court to weigh the evidence for a mere preponderance."
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without timely objection,8 7 the North Carolina decisions without ex-
ception deny this possibility, and promise a consistent application of, the
"legal residuum" rule.88 This view, however, has been the object of
convincing criticism. 9 To Professor Wigmore, it is "decidedly not the
wise and satisfactory rule for general adoption"9 0 since it not only rests
upon the fallacious assumption "that the 'legal' evidence is always cred-
ible and sufficient, while the 'illegal' evidence is never credible nor suffi-
cient",91 but also in its ultimate application "virtually requires the
tribunal to test its proceedings by the jury-trial rules", 92 thus retaining
the objectionable features incident to that requirement. 3 Yet, clearly,
the rule is valuable. While frequently the requirement of "some com-
petent evidence" may be no more than a legal fetish, quite often it pro-
tects substantial interests, securing litigants against fictitious claims;
and to sanction the admission of legally incompetent evidence reduces
the number of technical reversals, and greatly liberalizes the adminis-
trative practice. Furthermore, no rule, by whatever name called, could
escape for all cases the necessity of a legal residuum. Certainty, re-
liability and fairness should be the essentials of proof in common-law
court or administrative tribunal. Obviously, numerous jury-trial rules
are the best guaranty of these ends. The dlesideratum, therefore, is to
abandon the rule wherever a legal residuum would add nothing to the
probative character of the evidence adduced, although none of it be com-
petent in the strict legal sense. In short, insist only upon that residuum
best secured by compliance with those rules found essential in court
and commission alike.94 The North Carolina court might well relax its
view to conform to this policy, and any rule so designed would best be
8' See note 74, supra.
This expression, often seen as the "New York 'legal residuum' rule", was
apparently taken from Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. 450, 15S
N. Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't: 1915).
"9 See dissenting opinions in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435,
113 N. E. 507 (1916); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §4b, 39; Stephan,
supra note 1, at 247.0 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §4b, 42.91Ibid. "Id. at 40.
"Important among these objectionable features, according to Wigmore, is "the
temptation to practitioners to employ the whole arsenal of technical weapons and
secure a record full of 'errors'." Ibid. But, of course, the errors will be un-
availing on appeal under the "legal residuum" rule if, nonetheless, there is some
competent evidence to support the findings. '
"For a survey of specific jury-trial rules, suggesting which should be retained
and -which abandoned in administrative hearings, see Stephan, The Extent to Which
Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by the Rules of Evidence (1939) 18 ORE.
L. REV. 229. This article won the Ross Memorial essay prize of the American Bar
Association in 1938. Also see Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies
and Tibun ls (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 421; Collins, The Extent to Which
Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by the Rules of Evidence (1938) 12 CONN.
B. J. 278, 285. An excellent work in the general field is STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIVE
TaMUNAS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933).'
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couched in broad terms of "reasonableness", 95 so as not to fetter unduly
either the court or the commission. As individual jury-trial rules are
proven undesirable, they may be eliminated by specific statutes.96
CONCLUSION
Administrative procedure requires an administrative law of evidence.
Yet, in North Carolina, certain statutes and legalistic habits of thought,
which impose the traditional law, must first be hurdled. Amendment
may be often necessary; certainly the strict requirements in the utilities
commission statute can be avoided in no other way. But even where
the statute presents no obstacle, the law should be clarified by' a definite
expression of policy in order to assure a liberal attitude on appeal. Once
achieved, specific limitations to this policy may be expected to be gov-
erned by the "legal residuum" rule applied in workmen's compensation
cases; but even this rule may often impose a requirement which is not
essential to fair and accurate fact-finding by administrative officers.
Rules designed primarily to guide an untrained jury are excess baggage
in the hands of skilled commissioners. A uniform act, covering in so far
as possible all North Carolina tribunals, should combine a rule of "reason-
ableness" as regards evidence with a mode of procedure that may be-
supplemented by commission rules, and should cleariy' tefine a suitable
scope of review on appeal.9 7 Besides protecting interests of litigants,
"The American Bar Association Committee on Administrative Agencies and
Tribunals for 1939 considered the problem "altogether too broad to permit of a
categorical answer", and made no recommendations due to the diversity of adminis-
trative hearings and rules of evidence that one general rule or a code would have
to cover. As to hearsay, however, the committee considered the "rule of reason"
as "the only rule that can be sensibly laid down ... ; that, generally speaking, a
finding which is essential to the board's power to make any order at all should not
be permitted to rest wholly upon hearsay evidence, but that as to facts which are
merely subsidiary, the enforcement or relaxation of the hearsay rule should rest
in the sound discretion of the tribunal-having regard to questions of convenience,
expense and the availability of better types of evidence." Other rules of evidence
were "subject to the same general comment". Report of the Committee on Adinn-
istrative Agencies and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 421-425, 431. See
also Stephan, supra note 94, at 247-249 (recommendations center around the broad
standard of "fairness, necessity, availability, and reasonableness"). Notice the
"reasoiiableness" implications in the dicta from the Maley case, note 13, supra.
" California statutes combine statement of policy with treatment of specific
rules. See 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §4c, n. 70. See also Ross, supra
note 2, at 298 where it is said: "The declaration of a general policy is not enough.
The best type of provision that may be found is a provision expressly authorizing
the commission to admit in evidence and use as a basis of its findings declarations
of a deceased party made in good faith and before suit was brought; and a further
provision giving the commission the power to make rules as to the extent of and
mode of proof required, such power to include the power to establish a rule
permitting the use of common law 'hearsay evidence' .... The danger of a possible
abuse of the power does not off-set its value."
"' A mode of review aptly designed to resolve conflicting considerations as to
the proper appeal would permit a hearing before a judge, without a jury, on the
record compiled before the tribunal, and restricted to questions of law unless the
findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence or clearly erroneous.
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such an act would secure more fully -the advantages for which a spe-
cialized administrative system of trial was first created and, at the same
time, offer a testing-ground for those technical rules long considered of
doubtful utility even in courts of law.93 In this field particularly, the
ultimate success of any statute properly depends upon its full compre-
hension and intelligent application not only by competent commissioners,
but by judges and counsel as well.
E. H. SEAWELL.
Deeds-Construction-Conftict Between Premises and
Subsequent Clauses.
Where the premises of a deed read: "to [A] and her heirs by her
husband [B]", while all subsequent clauses inconsistently read: "to the
parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns",' held that A took
a fee tail special which by statute2 was converted into a fee simple.
Two dissenting justices favored the plaintiff's contention that A took as
tenant in common with her children, who were living at the time the
deed was executed, and that under C. S. 17393 the word heirs as used
in the premises should be interpreted to mean "children".
The majority found conclusive intention in the technical meaning
of the words used in the premises, thus attaching little or no importance
to the subsequent clauses of the deed. Reliance was placed on Harring-
ton v. Grimes.4 However, an examination of this case reveals no in-
consistency between the clauses of the -deed in question; rather, a fee
tail special was clearly conveyed, with no ambiguity clouding the intent
See Hoyt, loe. cit supra note 10. The case should be remanded for taking additional
evidence where counsel shows reasonable grounds for so doing. These provisions
are included in the uniform act recommended in Report of the Committee on Ad-
ministrative Agencies and Trbunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 432. In Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229, 59
Sup. St. 206, 217, 83 L. ed. 126, 140 (1938) the coutt defines "substantial evidence"
as . . more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Where, however,
a constitutional issue is involved, as in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
-orough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. ed. 908 (1920), the court must be
given an opportunity to substitute its independent judgment on a full review of the
facts.
" "Fact-finding boards may be the crucible from which will emerge improve-
ments in the formal rules themselves more speedily than the judicial system can
itself evolve [them] -without danger to its administration by breaking too quickly
with the continuity of the past." Collins, supra note 94, at 292.
'Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N. C. 121, 12 S. E. (2d) 906 (1941) (italics supplied).
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1734.
'N. C. CoDE Axi. (Michie, 1939) §1739. "A limitation by deed, will or other
writing, to the heirs of a living person, shall be construed to be td the children of
such person, unless a contrary intention appear by the deed or will."
'163 N. C. 76, 79 S. E. 301 (1913).
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of the grantor. The majority also refused to apply C. S. 1739 on the
ground that a precedent estate was limited to the ancestor. 5
At common law the premises of a deed were s'aid to control all sub-
sequent clauses in the event of repugnancy between them, yet this rule
was not inflexible unless the nature of the limitation in the premises was
expressly denominated, and in the absence of such specification the
quantum of the estate conveyed might be determined by the language of
the habendum.6 The present tendency is to view the instrument as a
whole and to utilize subsequent clauses in interpreting the premises.
Hence later clauses may be accorded a preponderating influence in the
interpretation of a deed.7 This view has prevailed in North Carolina
since the decision of Triplett v. Williams." Frequently it has been held
that if the whole instrument indicates that the grantor intended the
habendum to lessen, enlarge, restrict or qualify the estate named in the
granting clause, then such intent will prevail. 9 Again it is a familiar
rule of construction that inconsistencies are, if possible, to be reconciled
in such a way as to give effect to all the parts.?0
A study of the inconsistencies in the present deed offers but one
possible interpretation which will give effect to all parts of the instru-
ment, with each word given its normal meaning, i.e. that A became a
tenant in common with her children who were living at the time of the
conveyance. Thus full effect would be given to the persistent use of
the plural designation of the grantees in the subsequent clauses. The
alternative is to treat this as inadvertence only, which appears unwar-
ranted in the light of its repeated use.
The majority opinion follows the rule that technical terms such as
"heirs" and "heirs of the body" must be accorded their legal effect, al-
thought it is conceded that this rule is subject to modification should it
clearly appear from the instrument that such terms are used in some
other permissible sense. The North Carolina court has often found
the word "heirs" to be used other than as a word of limitation." One
frequent instance is the use of "heirs" as descriptio personarum. In
Acker v. Pridgen"' where the premises read: "unto the parties of the
Similar procedure in Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N. C. 333, 48 S. E. 765 (1904) and
in Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N. C. 200, 53"S. E. 842 (1906).
84 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §980.
'Ibid. 149 N. C. 394, 63 S. E. 72 (1908).
'Condor v. Secrest, 149 N. C. 201, 62 S. E. 921 (1908) ; Williams v. Williams,
175 N. C. 160, 95 S. E. 458 (1918) ; Roper Lumber Co. v. Herringtoii, 183 N. C. 85,
110 S. E. 656 (1922) ; Seawell v. Hall, 185 N. C. 80 116 S. E. 189 (1923).
"0 Gudger v. White, 141 N. C. 507, 54 S. E. 386 (1906) ; Goode v. Hearne, 180'
N. C. 475, 105 S. E. 5. (1920); Willis v. Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 183 N. C.
267, 111 S. E. 163 (1922); Seawell v. Hall, 185 N. C. 80, 116 S. E. 189 (1923).
" Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314, 51 S. E. 889 (1905) ; Campbell v. Everhart,
139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) ; Harrington v. Grimes, 163 N. C. 76, 79 S. E.
301 (1913) ; Williamson v. Cox, 218 N. C. 177, 10 S. E. (2d) 662 (1940).158 N. C. 337, 74 S. E. 335 (1912).
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second part [A and B] and to their heirs and assigns forever", yet the
habendum read: "to have and to hold the said property unto A and B
during their natural lives and after their death to their children [naming
the children]", the court ruled that the habendum clearly revealed an
intention to grant an estate in remainder to the children, and accord-
ingly the word "heirs" in the premises should be interpreted as meaning
"children". Thus a later clause was allowed to control the premises to
the extent of divesting a fee granted therein1 3
In the instant case an intention to use "heirs of the body" as
descriptio personarum rather than as a technical term of limitation fully
appears. Application of C. S. 1739 is unnecessary irn order to establish
A as tenant in common with her children.
By its refusal to construe the present deed as a whole, and by its
rigid reliance on the technical meaning of words in the premises, the
North Carolina court has apparently reverted to the strict rule of the
common law.14 It has done so in-the face of preponderant authority
to the effect that the intention of the grantor, as evidenced by the whole
must be given paramount consideration in the construction of a deed.15
JA ES H. Pou BAILEY.
Injunction-Usury-Public Nuisance
In an action1 brought by the Solicitor General of the State of
Georgia it was shown that defendants were engaged in the small loan
business, operating under the guise of purchasing salary assignments
from necessitous borrowers; that usurious rates were being charged,
in violation of the small loan law; that the requirements of the salary
purchase act were not being complied with; and that defendants were
not licensed as required by that act. In Georgia the taking of usury
and the violation of various provisions of the small loan law are mis-
demeanors. 2 An injunction and receiver were sought against this ille-
gal conduct, on the grounds that the acts constituted an injury to the
social interest and general welfare of the people of the state, that the
acts amounted to a public nuisance, and that the legal remedy was
"Accord: Rowland v. Rowland, 93 N. C. 214- (1885); Triplett v. Williams,
149 N. C. 394, 63 S. E. 76 (1908) ; Willis v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 183 N. C.
267, 111 S. E. 163 (1922) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPaR (3d ed. 1939) §981.it Cf. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 219 N. C. 333, 13 S. E. (2d) (1941) in which doubt
is cast upon the approach of the court in the principal case. Whitley v. Areitson
was cited by the minority.
" Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) ; Gudger v. White,
141 N. C. 507, 54 S. E. 386 (1906) ; Perrett v. Bird, 152 N. C. 220, 67 S. E. 507
(1910) ; Beacom v. Amos, 161 N. C. 357, 77 S. E. 407 (1913) ; Shoemaker v. Coats,
218 N. C. 251, 10 S. E. (2d) 810 (1940). In Gudger v. White (sapra) it was said
that the rule was inflexible.
I State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Investment Co., 12 S. E. (2d) 574 (Ga. 1940).
'GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933) §§ 25-301 et seq.
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inadequate. Held, injunction and receiver denied: this was not a suit
by the state because the solicitor general, without the governor's author-
ization, could not represent the state's interest, and therefore the injury
to the social interest and the general welfare could not be considered;
this misconduct did not amount to a public nuisance under the statu-
tory definition of a nuisance, the mere violation of a penal statute not
falling in this category; 'and the statutory penalty provided must be
deemed to be sufficient, any change in enforcement proceedings being
exclusively within the province of the legislature.
Usurious practices have sometimes been enjoined as a public nui-
sance3 or as inimical to the public welfare.4 These decisions illustrate
the ascendancy of injunction over the civil or criminal penalty as a
protector of the social interests of the state.5 Most cases, however, are
characterized by a hesitancy on the part of equity courts to act.0
The reasons for this hesitancy are probably threefold: (1) Equity
should not be used to enforce the police power.7 But as a practical
'State ex rel. Goff v. O'Neil, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939), noted in(1939) 38 MIcH. L. Rnv. 279, see note 27, infra; cf. State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L.
131, 62 At. 286 (Sup. Ct., 1905) ; State v. Martin, 77 N. i. L. 652, 73 AUt. 548
(1909) (direct proceeding by state allowed in form of an indictment against the
nuisance of maintaining a disorderly house). Contra;: Commonwealth v. Mutual
Loan & Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160 S. W. 1042 (1913) (suit brought on disorderly
house theory. N. J. cases distinguished in that usury is penalized in that state and
therefore is contrary to law, but no penalty provided in Ky.) ; State ex rel. Thomp-
son v. Dixie Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 306, 278 S. W. 59 (1925) ; Ex parte Hughes,
133 Tex. 305, 129 S. W. (2d) 270 (1939).
' State ex rel. Moore v. Gillian, 141 Fla. 707, 193 So. 751 (1940) (demurrer
overruled) ; State v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929), noted in
(1929) 30 COL. L. REv. 125, (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 472, (1930) 43 H~av. L. Rxv.
499, (1930) 14 MiNx. L. REv. 690, (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 590; State ex rel. Beck v.
Basham, 146 Kan. 181, 70 P. (2d) 24 (1937) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Grauman v.
Continental Co., Inc., 275 Ky. 238, 121 S. W. (2d) 49 (1938), noted in (1940) 28
Ky. L. J. 255. But cf. Means v. State, 75 S. W. (2d) 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
'See 5 PomEsoy, EQguT JURISDicrioN (2d ed. 1919) §1893.
Illustrative of this are State v. O'Leary, 155 Ind. 526, 58 N. E. 703 (1900);
State v. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47 (1892); State v. Ehrlick, 65
W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935 (1909) ; see Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237, 247 (1875) ;
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 413, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch. 1818) (Lord
Eldon: "I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of crimes... .").
'This seems to be the import of many of the cases in this field. Dean v. State,
151 Ga. 371, 106 S. E. 792 (1921) ; Bentley v. Board of Medical Examiners, 152
Ga. 836, 111 S. E. 379 (1922); Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 132 S. E. 528
(1926) ; see People v. Condon, 102 Ill. App. 449, 457 (1902) ("A court of equity
has no jurisdiction in matters merely criminal or merely immoral. It leaves the
correction of these offenses to the criminal courts. The remedy at law under the
statute is presumed to be adequate, for it is what the law has provided. If it be
inadequate, relief is to be had from the law-making power and not from the
courts.") ; State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578, 584, 188 N. W. 175, 178 (1922) ("If the
punishment provided is not sufficient, recourse should be had to the Legislature,
and not to the equity side of the courts.") ; State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 711,
712, 64 S. E. 935, 940, 941 (1909) "That criminal procedure and remedies are
adequate to maintain and uphold the public right in so far as moral and political
principles and general state policy are involved, is perfectly obvious. . . . If we
should sustain an injunction on the ground that the act is immoral as well as crim-
inal, we would be bound to award it in all criminal cases, for, in every instance,
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matter there should be no objection to injunctive enforcement of legis-
lative policies where the penalties prescribed prove ineffective. (2)
Where civil penalties are provided, the enforcement of these penalties
or the procurement of injunctive relief in case of their inadequacy is
limited to the individual harmed.8 But the state is not seeking to protect
an individual's rights by injunction, it is instead seeking protection of
the social interests of the community as a whole. (3) To enjoin crimi-
nal conduct would be unconstitutionally to deprive the defendant of a
jury trial.9 In support of this contention it is said that the injunction
adds nothing to the prohibition of the statute,10 and that in determining
a violation of the injunction, the court does without a jury exactly
what should be done with a jury in a criminal court.1" But no one is
entitled -to violate the criminal law merely to have the privilege of a
jury trial.1 2 The statutory prohibition is general, while the injunction
is specifically directed to the individual.1 8 The purpose of the injunc-
there is some reason, affecting the body politic, for prohibiting acts and making the
commission thereof criminal.").
'United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 8 Sup. Ct. 850, 31 L. ed.
747 (1887) ; see In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 586, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 907, 39 L. ed. 1092,
1103 (1895) (". . . it is not the province of the government to interfere in the
mere matter of -private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers
to enforce the rights of one against another.. :'). The idea is hinted at in Notes(1930) 43 HAav. L. REv. 499, 500; (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 939. See also Zimmer-
man v. Boyd, 97 Cal. App. 406, 275 Pac. 509 (1929); Pritchett v. Mitchell, 17
Kan. 355 (1876).
1 CHAFEE, THE INQUIRING MIND (1928) 74 et seg.; Mack, The Revival of
Criminal Equity (1903) 16 HAgv. L. Rxv. 389; dissenting opinion of Caldwell, J.,
in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). This argument
has most frequently arisen in connection with statutes making certain statutory
violations public nuisances, enjoinable in equity-the commonest situation being
liquor laws. Upholding the constitutionality of such statutes: Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. ed. 205 (1887) ; United States v. Reisenweber,
288 Fed. 520 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55(1889). Contra: Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285 (1919), 5 A. L. R.
1474 (1920). See for discussion of the problem (1929) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 269.
In Georgia and North Carolina jury trial is available at final hearing in in-junction cases as of right, 'with a binding verdict on issues of fact framed by the
pleadings. GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933) §37-1104, Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158, 33
S. E. 958 (1899); N. C. CoNsT. art. IV, §§1, 13; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§556, Ely v. Early, 94 N. C. 1 (1886). But, with one exception in Georgia-in
case of order or decree to pay money, and defendant contends he does not have
control over the money to be -paid-there is no right to a jury trial on the hearing
for contempt. GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933) §24-105; Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. C. 116(1882) ; In re Brown, 168 N. C. 417, 84 S. E. 690 (1915) ; State v. Little, 175 N. C.
743, 94 S. E. 680 (1918).
' Dissenting opinion of Field J., in Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E.
55 (1889) ; Dunbar, Government By Injunction (1897) 13 L. Q. REv. 347.
"1 See Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 389, 399
et seq.
" Opinion of Valliant, J., in State ex rel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 460, 105
S. W. 1078, 1085 (1907).
" Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime (1931) 26 ILL. L. REV. 259, 274.
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tion is to prevent harmful conduct, not to punish it,14 contempt pro-
ceedings being merely a mode of making the prevention effective.
15
To escape the effect of these arguments, the courts have developed
the policy that a public nuisance may be enjoined even though it is
also a statutory violation."' Another way of stating the same rule is
that criminal conduct will not be enjoined unless the conduct also
amounts to a public nuisance. 17 As a corollary it is sometimes said
that a mere statutory violation is not a public nuisance.18 To apply this
rule, there must be some workable conception of. what a public nuisance
is.' 9 The conventional definitions to be gleaned from the cases may be
roughly classified as a use of property which is harmful or offensive,
20
", Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630, 47 Sup. Ct. 218, 71 L. ed. 446 (1926) ;
Ex parte Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 909 (1924) ; Minke v. Hopeman, 87 Ill. 450
(1877) ; Stead v. Fortuer, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680 (1912); Respass v. Common-
wealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131 (1909).
"'In re Debs, 158 U.-S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (1895y; State v.
Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686 (1921); Hanbury v. Benedict, 60 App. Div.
662, 146 N. Y. Supp. 44 (2d Dep't 1914); Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair,
57 Utah 516, 196 Pac. 221 (1921).
"'In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (1895) ; Edison v.
Ramsey, 146 Ga. 767, 92 S. E. 513 (1917) ; State v. Lindsay, 85 Kan. 79, 116 Pac.
207 (1925) ; Kentucky State Board of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382,
281 S. W. 188 (1926).
" Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, 109 At. 786 (1920) ; State v. Ehrlick,
65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935 (1909).
"' Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S. E. 792 (1921), 40 A. L. R. 1132 (1926)
(unlicensed chiropractor) ; Bentley v. Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836,
111 S. E. 379 (1922) (unlicensed physician) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 132
S. E. 528 (1926) (unlicensed money lender) ; State ex rel. C. B. & Q. Ry. v.
Woolfolk, 269 Mo. 389, 190 S. W. 877 (1916) (liquor law) ; State ex rel. Alton v.
Salley, 215 S. W. 241 (Mo. 1919) (liquor law); State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578,
188 N. W. 175 (1922) (unlicensed chiropractor) ; People v. Vandewater, 250 N. Y.
83, 164 N. E. 864 (1928) (liquor law); cf. quotation from State v. Crawford,
infra, note 20. In most of these cases the court seemed to rely more on a presumed
adequacy and exclusiveness of the legal remedy than on the non-existence of a
nuisance. See discussion of statutory violations made nuisance by statute, supra,
note 9.
"0 'Nuisance' is a good word to beg a question with. It is so comprehensive a
term, and its content is so heterogeneous, that it scarcely does more than state a
legal conclusion that for one or another of widely varying reasons the thing
stigmatized as a nuisance violates the rights of others." Thayer, Public Wrong and
Private Action (1914) 27 HAv. L. Rxv. 317, 326. For examples, see definitions in
46 C. J. 645.
'0 Cases following this restricted view are probably based on Chancellor Kent's
dictum in Attorney-Gen'l. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 380 (N. Y. 1817):
"It is an extremely rare case, and may be considered, if it ever happened, as an
anomaly, for a court of equity to interfere at all, and much less preliminarily by
injunction, to put down a public nuisance vhich did not violate the rights of
property, but only contravened the general policy." State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo. App.
413 (1883) ; see Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237, 247 (1875) ; State v. Schweickardt,
109 Mo. 496, 515, 19 S. W. 47, 53 (1892) (this and the Uhrig case probably over-
ruled by State ex ref. Crow v. Canty, infra). If the requisite property interest
cannot be found on the -plaintiff's side, then the use of property by the defendant is
accepted as a substitute. Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E.
914 (1895); State v. Crawford, 2 Kan. 727, 42 Am. Rep. 182 (1882) ("every
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which endangers the public health, safety, or physical well-being,21 or
which affronts the public morals or sense of decency. 22 This method
of defining a public nuisance is, however, unnecessarily technical and
superficial.28 A definition more in keeping with the public need might
be: conduct so endangering the social interests of a sufficiently large
segment of the public that injunctive restraint would be more appro-
priate than resort to statutory sanctions.24 Unless the state is seeking
to protect its own property,2 5 this represents the only true basis for
public injunction.28
place where a public statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, persistently
and intentionally violated is a public nuisance") ; Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116
Ky. 212, 75 S. W. 261 (1903) ; Respass v. Cpmmonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W.
1131 (1909); Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass.: 550, 22 N. E. 55 (1889); People v."
Vandewater, 250 N. Y. 83, 164 N. E. 864 (1928). Compare State ex rel. Crow v.
Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078 (1907) with Commonwealth v. McGovern,
supra. See Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime (1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 259 for
analysis of cases on which Chancellor Kent based his dictum in Attorney-Gen'l. v.
Utica Ins. Co., supra.
2Baltimore v. Board of Health, 139 Md. 210, 115 At. 43 (1921); Attorney-
Gen'l. v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 133 Mass. 361, (1882) ; Pine City v. Munch,
42 Minn. 342, 44 N. W. 197 (1890) ; Attorney-Gen'l. v. Paterson, 58 N. J. Eq. 1,
42 At. 749 (Ch., 1899) ; Southampton v. Scott, 91 N. J. Eq. 443, 110 At. 587 (Ch.,
1920) ; see State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 709, 64 S. E. 935, 939 (1909) where it
is said that there is a property interest to be found in protection of public health.
Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680 (1912) ; State ex rel. Crow v,
Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078 (1907).
"' The classificatory method of looking at the public nuisance seems to be a
fairly common one. For examples, see Hart v. Leonard, 42 N. J. Eq. 416, 7 Atl.
865 (1886); Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285 (1919); State v.
Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935 (1909). For criticism of this method, see
Chafee, Progress of the Lau-Equitable Relief Against Torts (1921) 34 HARv. L.
REv. 388, 391.
2 This is really a statement of the basis for equity's action. It may be that
whenever it takes this sort of action it should be deemed to be enjoining a public
nuisance. This seems to be Walsh's view. "But equity's protection of public
interests is limited to cases of .public nuisances as outlined above, including any
continuous business or activity 'which will be a continuous or indefinitely repeated
menace to the public health and safety, or to the public morals or public sense of
decency, and other cases in which prevention by equitable action is better than
punishment." (Italics supplied) WALsHr, EQuIrY (1930) 207. Caldwell, however,
seems not to think that the concept of public nuisance need be extended this far
in order to give equitable relief. Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime (1931) 26
ILL. L. Rnv. 259, 269. See note 29, infra. See People ex tel. Dyer v. Clark, 268
I1. 156, 162, 180 N. E. 994, 996 (1915).
" Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 249
(U. S. 1851) ; Florida v. Anderson, 91 U. S. 667, 23 L. ed. 290 (1875) ; United
States v. Luce, 141 Fed. 385 (C. C.. Del. 1905) ; People v. Truckee Lumber Co.,
116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374, 39 L. R. A. 581 (1897) ; People v. Monterey Fish Prod-
ucts Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398, 38 A. L. R. 1186 (1925).
20 WALsH, EQUITY (1930) §§38, 39; Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime
(1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 259. The interests of the state as a juristic person are
public interests, while the interests of the community at large are social interests,
according to Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28 HARV. L. Rav. 343, 344.
Of course there is always the question of adequacy of the legal remedy. If the
statutory procedure is adequate, clearly, under established equity practice, the in-
junction should not be granted. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39
L. ed. 1092 (1895); People v. Universal Chiropractors' Ass'n., 302 Ill. 228, 134
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If the definition of public nuisance is limited to certain specific
uses of land, then the social interests which equity may protect are
likewise limited. If, however, the court realizes the true basis and
reason for its action, and defines public nuisance accordingly, as sug-
gested, it is limited in the interests it will protect only by their relation
to the social welfare and the preferability from the social standpoint
of injunctive prevention to legal penalties. This seems a preferable
concept of the public nuisance. If the court-follows this broad concept,
there would seem to be no good reason why usury should not be de-
nominated a public nuisance and so enjoined. Certainly it is a material
violation of the social interests in economic security. And civil and
criminal penalties have been notoriously ineffective.27
If the statutory definition of public nuisance will not conceivably
include usury,28 or if the court, operating on the common law theory,
cannot bring itself to call usury. a public nuisance, the state can still
proceed on the theory of a suit for injunction to protect the public
welfare.29 This is nothing more than the liberal public nuisance theory
stripped of its historical limitations to uses of land, and parading as
what it is-a suit to protect the state's social interests where specific
injunction as a prevention would be better than general statutory pro-
hibition and punishment procedure30 Certainly, usurious practices
could be reached on this basis.
N. E. 4 (1922) ; State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578, 188 N. W. 175 (1922) ; Attorney-
Gen'l, v. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq. 89 (Ch. 1873) ; see State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700,
705, 64 S. E. 935, 937 (1909).2 For an excellent survey of the entire problem, see 8 LAw & CoN'm.P. PoB.,
No. 1 (Winter, 1941).
; 8People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930) (injunction de-
nied). The California statute requires an injury to health, offense to the senses,
obstruction in the free use of property, or purpresture. Clearly usury does not
fall within any of these and could not have been enjoined as a public nuisance.
Noted in (1930) 18 CA. L. REv. 328. In Minnesota the statute includes "doing an
act -. . . which shall annoy, injure, or endanger the safety,- health, comfort, or
repose of any considerable number of persons." MrNzf. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§10241. This has been held to include usury. State ex. rel. Goff v. O'Neil, 205
Minn. 366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939), noted in (1939) 38 Micir. L. Rrv. 279.
This theory is probably based on the famous dictum in In re Debs, 158 U. S.
564, 584, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 906, 39 L. ed. 1092, 1102 (1895) : "Every government,
entrusted by the very terms of its being with powers and duties to be exercised and
discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any
proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other... The
obligation which it is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the
wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself
sufficient to give it a standing in court." Cases following this theory: United States
v. Am. Bond & Mortgage Cq., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D. II1., 1929), aff'd 52 F. (2d)
318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; State v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686, 25 A. L. R.
1210 (1921); Kentucky State Board of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382,
281 S. W. 188 (1926); People v. Federated Radio Corp., 216 App. Div. 250, 214
N. Y. Supp. 670. (2d Dep't 1926) ; State Bar v. Retail Credit Ass'n., 170 Okla.
246, 37 P. (2d) 954 (1934) ; Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair, 57 Utah 516,
196 Pac. 221 (1921). See note 4, supra.
" Of course, the arguments set forth above as to equitable enforcement of the
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In the instant case the only theory considered was that of public
nuisance. The court's reasoning on this subject is not clear. It states
that usury 'does not fall within its statutory definition of a public
nuisance, which is admittedly merely declaratory of the common law. 1
But it is very heavily implied that the existence of a statutory penalty
was determinative of the court's inability to act.82 This sounds like the
police power argument. 33 Although the court explicitly recognizes the
policy that "equity will enjoin an existing nuisance although the acts
to be enjoined constitute crimes",3 4 its conception of nuisance is ap-
parently restricted to uses of land. Perhaps the court viewed the legal
penalty provided as adequate. It was clearly shown, however, that the
borrowers and the community were menaced by the defendants' con-
duct, and that other remedies were ineffective.3 5 To this the court re-
plied, "If the penalties there provided be not a sufficient check to the
abuses described in the instant case, the appeal should be made to the
lawmakers, and not to a court of equity, whose powers can never be
invoked where the law has provided what it deems to be an adequate
remedy." 30 This is an abdication of equity's most important function
of developing new remedies to meet new social needs.
SAMUEL R. LEAGER.
Jurisdiction-Service of Summons on Foreign Corporations.
Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident, brought suit in North Carolina
against a Tennessee corporation, doing business as a common carrier in
North Carolina, to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of
a collision in Tennessee. Service of process was made upon the process
agent in North Carolina, appointed by defendant in pursuance of U. S.
police power and of civil and criminal penalties may be advanced against this theory,
but if the test for equitable action is used of the preferability of prevention to
punishment, the theory would seem to stand up. See Caldwell, Injunctions Against
Crime (1930) 26 ILL. L. Rrv. 259, 270-275 for limitations on equity's action in this
field. For problem where statute makes criminal conduct enjoinable, similar to
statutes making criminal conduct a public nuisance, see State Bar v. Retail Credit
Ass'n., 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. (2d) 954 (1934) ;" Board of Medical Examiners v.
Blair, 57 Utah 516, 196 Pac. 221 (1921).
" GA. CODE (Harrison, 1933) §§72-101, 72-102.
" Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S. E. 792, 40 A. L. R. 1132 (1921); Bentley v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836, 111 S. E. 379 (1922) ; Bennett v.
Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 132 S. E. 528 (1926) are cited. See note 18, supra. See also
People v. Universal Chiropractors' Ass'n., 302 Ill. 228, 134 N. E. 4 (1922) ; Red-
mond v. State, 152 Miss. 54, 118 So. 360 (1928) ; State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578,
188 N. W. 175 (1922).
" See note 7, supra. "See notes 16 and 17, supra.
" Borrowers were usually so ignorant of their rights, or of such limited means,
that they were unable to enforce them. " 12 S. E. (2d) 574, 581 (GA. 1940).
[Vol. 19
NOTES AND COMMENTS
C. A. Title 49, sec. 321(c)-an act regulating interstate carriers. Held:
Such service is not sufficient on a cause of action arising in another
jurisdiction.'
At common law a corporation could not be served with process out-
side the state in which it was incorporated. 2 The theory was that the
corporation, just as an individual, could be served only where found,
and as a legal entity the corporation had -no existence outside the state
of its creation.3 Injustice to plaintiff parties resulted, and two theories
developed to justify service upon a foreign corporation: (1) The pres-
ence theory, and (2) the consent theory.4 The presence theory has as
its basis the idea that a foreign corporation is present in any state in
which it does business.5 The consent theory arose out of two factors:
(1) The fact that a corporation may voluntarily submit to personal
jurisdiction in any state,0 and (2) the fact that a state may absolutely
exclude the corporation from doing business within its bounds7 (unless
the business is solely of an interstate nature), 8 and thus a state may
impose conditions upon doing such business.9 This may take the form
of a statute requiring a foreign corporation to provide an agent upon
whom process may be served ;1o or a statute might set out itself, within
limits, agents of the corporation upon whom service may be made."
If a foreign corporation does business within the state without comply-
ing with such statute, then there may be a provision appointing an
officer of the state to act as process agent for the corporation.' 2 Doing
business within the state is regarded as an acceptance of such a statutory
provision.13
In order to satisfy federal due process for service upon a foreign
corporati6n, it must appear: (1) That the corporation is doing business
I King v. Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 223, 13 S. E. (2d) 233 (1941).
2 1 KYm, CORPORATIONS (1793) 272.
I Ibid. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274 (U. S. 1839).
'BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CouoRATIoN LAw Am& PRAcTxcE (1930) §291.
5International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944, 58
L. ed. 1479 (1913).
"New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup.
Ct. 364, 28 L. ed. 379 (1884); Pennsylvania Fite Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
& Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ot. 344, 61 L. ed. 610 (1917); Flour City
Ornamental Iron Co. v. General Bronze Corp., 21 F. Supp. 112 (D. Minn. 1937).
7Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (U. S. 1868).
' International Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L.
ed. 678 (1910) ; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66
L. ed. 458 (1922).
1 BEALE, FOREIGN COPORATIONS (1904), ch. VII (Collection of these statutes).20 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1137.
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §483(1).
112 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1137.
* Anderson v. United States Fidelity Co., 174 N. C. 417, 90 S. E. 948 (1917);
BEALP, FOREIGN COPORATIONS (1904) §266.
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within the state where service is sought,' 4 and (2) that service is had
upon a proper agent, present in the state.15
Since a state may not refuse to allow a corporation engaged solely
in interstate commerce to come within its bounds, and since it cannot
require a license for such activity, 0 it would seem, at least under the
"consent" theory, that interstate commerce within the state does not
constitute doing business for the purposes of service. But the United
States Supreme Court has held that service made upon the agent des-
ignated by state statute is valid, though the business of the corporation
be solely interstate. 17
No detailed account of what "doing business" means for the pur-
poses of service is attempted here ;18 for in its last analysis it is a question
of fact to be determined largely by the circumstances of each individual
case, rather than by fixed, definite, and precise rules.' 9 In the principal
case no question was raised as to the defendant's doing business in North
Carolina.
When the cause of action arose in the state, the question of a proper
agent is not as difficult as when the cause of action arose outside the
state. Clearly in the former case an agent appointed specifically for the
purpose by the defendant is a proper one.20 Where service is made upon
"' Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (U. S. 1855) ; St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U. 5. 350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354, 27 L. ed. 222 (1882); Goldey v.
Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559, 39 L. ed. 517 (1894) (even
when service of summons is made upon the president of the corporation within
the state, it is not sufficient unless -the corporation is doing business in the state) :
Greer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428, 23 Sup. Ct. 807, 41 L. ed. 1122
(1903) ; Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 31 Sup. Ct. 127, 54
L. ed. 1155 (1910); 'Herndon-Carter Co. v. James N. Norris, Son & Co., 224
U. S. 496, 32 Sup. Ct. 550, 56 L. ed. 857 (1912) ; St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Alexan-
der, 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. ed. 486 (1913) ; Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. v. McKiblin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 Sup. Ct. 280, 61 L. ed. 710 (1917).
1 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308,
43 L. ed. 569 (1899) ; Herndon-Carter Co. v. Norris & Co., 224 U. S. 496, 32 Sup.
Ct. 550, 56 L. ed. 857 (1912) ; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKiblin, 243 U. S.
264, 37 Sup. Ct. 280, 61 L. ed. 710 (1917); Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pa.
Casualty Co., 124 Fed. 259 (C. C. M. D. Pa. 1903) ; Grant v. Cananea Consolidated
Copper Co., 117 App. Div. 576, 102 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1st Dep't 1907); State v.
Ruttedge, 331 Mo. 1015, 56 S. W. (2d) 28 (1932).
" International Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. ed.
678 (1910) ; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66 L. ed.
458 (1922).1 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944, 58
L. ed. 1479 (1913).
" Osborne, Arising Out of Business Done in the State (1923) 7 MINN. L. REV.
380; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 1018.
"9 See Ivey Rivers Land Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 192 N. C. 115, 119, 133
S. E. 424, 426 (1926).
" New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct.
364, 28 L. ed. 379 (1884); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U S. 93 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. ed. 610 (1917) ; Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Seldon Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 Sup. Ct. 84, 66 L. ed.
201 (1921); Morris v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 49 Sup. Ct. 360, 73
L. ed. 762 (1929).
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an agent of the corporation, not appointed by it as process agent, then
the agent must be "representative of the company and its business" and
may not be a subordinate employee or a person performing a single
transaction. 2 1  But it is not necessary that the agent be connected with
the business in the state where served, for service upon a resident
director was held valid, though his duties weie performed in the state
of incorporation alone.22  And where the controlling statute provides
that service may be made upon an 6fficer of the state if the corporation
does not specify an agent, the fact that the statute makes no provision
for actual notice to be sent the corporation does not render it invalid
for want of due process.2 3 It is said that the corporation consents to
the terms of the statute by doing business within the state.2 4
However, when the cause of action is not domestic, even if the agent
is appointed by the defendant in compliance with a statute, the United
States Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of compelling lan-
guage in the statute or a local decision to the contrary, such appoint-
ment does not include consent to be served in such a foreign cause of
action.235 But in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining. &
Milling Co.,26 jurisdiction was sustained, although the cause of action
did not arise in the state, since the statute under which the agent was
appointed was construed to include consent to service in such a case.
So there is no constitutional objection here, once the statute in question
is so construed.
In cases where the corporation does business in the state without
appointing an agent for service of process, and the statute provides that
service shall be made upon a state official, the fact that the cause of
action is foreign has a definite bearing. In Old Wayne Life Ins. Co. v.
McDonough27 and Simon v. Southern Ry.,28 the United States Supreme
"1 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (U. S. 1855);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L. ed. 569
(1899) ; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. ed.
486 (1913) ; Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pa. Casualty Co, 124 Fed. 259 (C. C.
M. D. Pa. 1903) ; Moore v. Freeman's Nat. Bank, 92 N. C. 590 (1885) ; Platt v.
Michael, 214 N. C. 665, 200 S. E. 429 (1939) ; see St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350,
356, 1 Sup. Ct. 354, 362, 27 L. ed. 222, 226 (1882).
2 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 25 Sup. Ct. 483, 49 L. ed. 810
(1904).
" Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 289
U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256 (1933). 2, Ibid.
" Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Seldon Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42
Sup. Ct. 84, 66 L. ed. 201 (1921) ; Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S.
405, 49 Sup. Ct. 360, 73 L. ed. 762 (1929).2, 243, U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. ed. 610 (1916).
"7204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. ed. 345 (1907) ; cf. Mass. Bonding & Ins.
Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) ; O'Neil v.
Long Transportation Corp., 19 F. Supp. 477 (D. Nev. 1937).
2-236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255, 59 L. ed. 492 (1914) ; cf. Mass. Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) ; O'Neil
v. Long Transportation Corp., 19 F. Supp. 477 (D. Nev. 1937).
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Court limited service of this sort on the grounds that the corporation's
consent to be served was confined to domestic causes of action. In the
McDonough case the court said: "While the highest considerations of
public policy demand that an insurance corporation, entering a state in
defiance of a statute which lawfully prescribes the terms upon which it
may exert its powers there, should be held to have assented to such
terms as to business there transacted by it, it would be going very far
to imply, and we do not imply, such assent as to business transacted
in another state, although citizens of the former state may be interested
in such business. ' 29 If such a holding is based on the "presence"
theory, it would seem that if the corporation is amenable to process for
a domestic cause of action, personal jurisdiction should not fail merely
because the cause of action arose elsewhere. If based upon the "con-
sent" theory, probably the distinction is justified by saying that the cor-
poration, by doing business in the state without authorization, impliedly
consented to be served in actions growing out of that business; but not
as to actions arising elsewhere which might necessitate inconvenience
and added expense to the corporation.
At any rate it should apparently follow that where an agent of the
corporation itself is served (the corporation not having appointed him
as process agent) the holding would be the same as in cases where a state
official is served; for there is no express consent in either case. But
the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld service where a
representative agent of the corporation is served, even though the cause
of action be foreign and there is no express consent to service.80 No
reasoning to distinguish this sort of case from the ones where service
was made upon a state officer has been found. Perhaps the court had
in mind actual notice to the corporation; but this problem seems to be
the same regardless of where the cause of action arose.
The fact that the plaintiff is a non-resident does not necessarily de-
feat the action.8'
Thus as far as &due process is concerned, the determining factor as to
service in a cause of action arising outside the state apparently is the
type of agent served. Of course the court of a state may not entertain
29204 U. S. 8, 22, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 241, 51 L. ed. 345, 351 (1907).
"Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 20 L. ed. 354 (U. S.1 1870);
N. Y., S. E. & W. R. R. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 13 Sup. Ct. 444, 37 L. ed. 292(1893); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526, 42 L. ed.
964 (1897) ; Denver & R. G. W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152, 76
L. ed. 295 (1932) semble.
" Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 1., 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355, 73
L. ed. 747 (1928) (a state may by statute discriminate against non-residents;
though under the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution a
state may not discriminate against citizens of another state). In the principal case
since process was served on an agent appointed under an act of Congress, there
is no question of statutory discrimination by a state.
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a foreign cause of action if it is not a transitory one3 2 or if it would
violate the public policy of the state of forum to do, so, 3 irrespective of
the question of service.
But if the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce, due process
may be satisfied and still the action fail if entertaining it would unduly
burden interstate commerce. Here we are not concerned with the type
of agent served, as in the case of due process when the cause of action
is not domestic; but with three factors: (1) Whether the plaintiff is a
resident or non-resident, (2) whether the cause of action arose outside
or within the state, and (3) whether the corporation is operating within
the state. "Operating" as used here is to be distinguished from "doing
business". The former, in the case of a railroad company, refers to
whether the company has trackage in the state. A corporation may be
-doing business within the state without operating therein. As seen, in
the case of due process the first and third of these factors apparently
have no effect, but when the doctrine of interstate commerce is applied
all of them are of potential importance as they appear in different
combinations.
The question of interstate commerce was first raised in Davis v.
Farmers' Co-operative Co.3 4 There the United States Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a state statute providing for service on a foreign
corporation as applied to a cause of action arising outside the state and
brought by a non-resident plaintiff against a corporation not operating
within the state. Previous similar cases were distinguished on the
grounds that in those cases the only question raised was that of due
process.85 Since the Davis case, most courts have held that although
the plaintiff is a resident, the other factors being the same, to entertain
jurisdiction constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. 6 But
where the plaintiff is not a resident, and the -cause of action is foreign,
and the defendant is operating in the state, most decisions have upheld
jurisdiction.37 A fortiori where the plaintiff is a resident, and the cause
"Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 105, 15 Sup. Ct 771, 39 L. ed.
913 (1894) ; Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 8 S. W. 907 (1888) ; Davenport
v. Gannon, 123 N. C. 362, 31 S. E. 858 (1898) ; Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew
Irr. Co., 23 Utah 627, 66 Pac. 188 (1901).
"3 BEALE, THE CNFLICt oF LAWS (1935) 1647.
"262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556, 67 L. ed. 996 (1923) ; Atchison, T. & S. Ry.
v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 Sup. Ct. 469, 68 L. ed. 928 (1924).
" See Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312, 317, 43 Sup. Ct. 556,
558, 67 L, ed. 996, 999 (1923).
" Michigan Cent. R. I. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct 207, 73 L. ed. 470
(1928); Denver & R. G. W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152, 76
L. ed. 295 (1932) ; Miele v. Chicago, M., S. & P. R. R., 151 Misc. 137, 270 N. Y.
Supp. 788 (N. Y. City Cts., 1934). Contra: Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 28 F.(2d) 998 (W. D. Mo. 1928) ; Cressez v. Erie R. R., 278 Mass. 284, 180 N. E. 160
(1932).
3 Harris v. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co., 12 F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C. 1926); Mc-
Whorter v. Williams, 228 Ala. 632, 155 So. 309 (1934) ; Boright v. Chicago R. R
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of action is foreign, and the defendant is operating in the state, juris-
diction has been sustained.33 A similar result has been reached where
the plaintiff is a resident, and the cause of action is not foreign, and
the defendant is not operating in the state.8 9 Though the language in
some cases is to the effect that the residence or non-residence of the
plaintiff is not to be disregarded, 40 it may be said, at least in view of
the cases so far, that the other two factors are of much more importance.
In the application of the interstate commerce doctrine it is not clear
whether each case might, to a ceitain extent, depend on its own facts
or whether the three factors in certain combinations will give an auto-
matic result. For example, if it is not shown that there would be any
inconvenience in transporting witnesses or added burden of any sort on
the corporation, would service in a foreign cause of action against a
defendant not operating in the state necessarily fail because a burden on
interstate commerce? This question has not been answered. Although
the court will not investigate the relative inconvenience to the parties
to determine whether jurisdiction shall be retained, it seems that the
defendant should be compelled to show that some burden will be placed
upon interstate commerce.41
In the principal case the decision was solely upon the ground of due
process. It may have been thought that since the defendant was oper-
ating in North Carolina, the question of interstate commerce was not
open. However, since Congress has power to regulate interstate com-
merce, the question, if presented, would be whether the act was intended
to extend to such a situation and not whether an unconstitutional burden
was cast on interstate commerce.
In the principal case the court relied on Old Wayne Life Ins Co. v.
McDonough and Sinon v. Southern Ry. As seen, those cases, unlike
the principal case, were ones where the defendant was doing business
in the state without authority. And there, service was had upon an
officer of the state, and not upon an agent appointed by the defendant.
Since the instant defendant appointed an agent for service of process
180 Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457 (1930) ; Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173
S. E. 583 (1934). Contra: Panstwowe Zaklady Graviozone v. Automobile Ins. Co.,36 F. (2d) 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) ; Iron City Produce Co. v. Amer. Ry., 22 Ohio
App. 165, 153 N. E. 316 (1926).
"s Denver & R. G. W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152, 76 L. ed.
295 (1932) ; Amer. Ry. Ex.p. Co. v. Rouw Co., 173 Ark. 810, 294 S. W. 401 (1927) ;
Cohen v. Del., S. & W. R. R., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Sup. Ct., 1934).
" Mo. ex. rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47,
69 L. ed. 247 (1924) ; Pere Marquette Ry. v. Tifton Produce Co., 48 Ga. App. 286,
172 S. E. 727 (1934).
" See Int. Milling Co. v. Columbia Co., 292 U. S. 511, 520, 54 Sup. Ct. 797, 799,
78 L. ed. 1396, 1401 (1933).
" Denver & R. G. W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152, 76 L. ed.
295 (1932).
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pursuant to an act of Congress, it seems that those cases concerned with
appointment of an agent under state statutes would be more pertinent.
In those cases the United States Supreme Court has held that appoint-
ment would not include consent to service in a foreign cause of action
in the absence of compelling language in the statute or a local decision
to the contrary. Accordingly it would seem that the North Carolina
Court should have determined whether such compelling language ap-
peared in the Congressional act. In any event, it does not seem that
the United States Supreme Court cases make it imperative that service
in the principal case be found to violate due process irrespective of
statutory construction. Further, the court distinguished the principal
case from Steele v. Telegraph Co.,4 2 where process was upheld, solely
upon the ground that that case -did not involve service upon an agent des-
ignated by defendant in compliance with an act of Assembly or of Con-
gress. While service has been upheld in cases similar to the Steele
case,43 it seems that where the defendant himself designates a process
agent there is stronger basis for upholding jurisdiction than where the
agent is designated by statute.
As far as convenience is concerned, the result reached in the prin-
cipal case is a desirable one, but the North Carolina position does need
clarifying.
PHILIP E. LUCAS.
Limitation of Actions-Torts--Accrual of Right of Action
for Negligence.
In Powers v. Trust Co.,' defendant leased to plaintiff a house in-
fected with germs of pulmonary tuberculosis. Defendant knew but
failed to disclose to the plaintiff that the prior occupant had died of
the disease only a month before. Plaintiff, previously robust and healthy,
manifested severe symptoms of tuberculosis approximately eighteen
months after date of exposure, hospitalization being necessary. Suit
for damages for negligent breach of duty to disclose was brought some
two and one-half years from the time of the discovery of the disease.
Held, that recovery was barred by the three-year. statute of limitations 2
which began to run at the time of the original breach of duty, and not
from the time of the first manifestation of harm.
North Carolina thus reaffirms 3 its agreement with the practically
12 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583 (1934). See note 30, supra.
1219 N. C. 254, 13 S. E. (2d) 431 (1941).
2 N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §441(2).
'The precedents cited by the court in the principal case are: Daniel v. Grizzard,
117 N. C. 105, 23 S. E. 93 (1895) (right of action against register of deeds held
to accrue at time of failure to register and index mortgage, not at time of damage
resulting therefrom) ; Bank of Spruce Pine v. McKinney, 209 N. C. 668, 184 S. E.
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universal rule that, in negligence cases, the right of action for damages
accrues at the time of the negligent act or omission, and that the statute
of limitations begins to run at once.4 It is immaterial that the damage
or the right of action resulting from the negligent act or omission is not
discovered until later. The gist of the action is the breach of duty,
without regard to concurrence of substantial injury making suit prac-
ticable. The purpose of this arbitrary rule is said to be the suppression
of fraud and the prevention of the recurrence of stale claims prejudicial
to the defendant due to loss of evidence or obscuring of facts by lapse
of time or removal of witnesses.5  The rule has been applied in a variety
of situations," of which the professional malpractice cases are perhaps
the best-known example. It is believed that in many such cases the
courts, by blind adherence to precedent and an unnecessarily technical
interpretation of a "right of action", have wrought injustice, and per-
mitted a negligent tortfeasor to escape liability by reason of his own
silence and the insidious nature of the injuries inflicted.
It is essential to recognize this discussion as confined only to those
cases in which a technical right of action precedes the incidence of dam-
age, and the injuries or right of action do not become known until later.
Limited to this group of cases, the general rule has seldom been con-
tradicted. Only one decision, not based on a statute, directly contra
has been found.7 Many courts, however, conscious of the frequent
hardships incident to the rule, have resorted to legalistic devices in an
effort to avoid inequity. In malpractice cases, several jurisdictions have
held that the statute does not begin to run until the termination of the
relationship of physician and patient, reasoning that no right of action
accrued until the termination of the doctor's "continuing duty" to dis-
close the negligence to the plaintiff.8 A second avenue of escape, the
506 (1936) ; cf. Blount v. Parker, 78 N. C. 128 (1878) (defendant's lack of knowl-
edge did not prevent running of statute against an action for the conversion of
personal property) ; Gordon v. Fredle, 206 N. C. 734, 175 S. E. 126 (1934) (right
of action for slander accrues at time of utterance, not at time of plaintiff's identifica-
tion of slanderer).
'KELLY, ConE LIMiTAToNs (1903) §§103, 104; 2 WooD, LIMITATIONS (4th ed.
1916) §179. For collections of cases supporting the general rule, see 17 R. C. L.
763-765 (1917) ; Notes (1909) 13 Ann. Cas. 696; (1909) 126 Am. Si. Rep. 944.
'Mask v. Tiller, 89 N. C. 423, 426 (1883); Note (1934) 12 TEXAs L. REV.
478.
,17 R. C. L. 763-765 (1917). As to physician's malpractice, see Notes L. R. A.
1917C 1172; (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1317; (1937) 35 Micn. L. REV. 839; (1934) 13
TENN. L. REv. 131. As to malpractice of attorneys, see Sullivan v. Stou, 120
N. J. L. 304, 199 Atl. 1 (1938) ; Note (1939) 118 A. L. R. 215. As to negligent
acts of public officials, see State v. Walters, 31 Ind. App. 77, 66 N. E. 182 (1903);
Note (1909) 126 Am. St. Rep. 944.
" Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 Atl. 83 (1917) (cause of action againstphysician held to accrue at time of discoloration of skin, not at time physician was
first negligent in use of the discoloring agent).
' Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N. W. 708 (1930) ; Conklin v. Draper,
254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930) ; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E.
865 (1902) ; Lotten v. O'Brien, 146 Wis. 258, 131 N. W. 361 (1911).
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"fraudulent concealment" exception to the main rule, will. be treated
later. Both these constructions represent attempts to compromise the
harshness of the rule with the natural dictates of justice, rather than
directly to challenge the rule itself.
However, there are analogous situations which support the human-
itarian view that the statute should not begin to run until the right of
action is discovered or substantial damage occurs. The rule laid down
in two of North Carolina precedents cited by the court has not gone
uncontradicted. It has been held that where a register of deeds fails
correctly to record a conveyance, the cause of action against him accrues-
when the vendee is deprived of the property, not when the negligence
occurred.9 In workmen's compensation cases the weight of authority
seems to be that the statute begins to run, not from the time of exposure
to the occupational disease, but from the time of the physical manifesta-
tion thereof.' 0 It has been held that the right of action against an attorney
for failure to maintain fire insurance on a client's house ran from the
time of destruction by fire, and not from the time the attorney allowed
the policy to lapse." Where money is paid by mistake, it is generally
held that the statute does not begin to run until the inistake is discov-
ered, although the payee was exposed to a right of action from the time
of the receipt of the funds.'2  Nor does the statute begin running on an
action against an attorney for misappropriation of monies collected by
him for his client until the latter has received notice of such collection.' 3
For breach of covenants against encumbrances and of seisin and title,
the majority rule is that, although the right of action for nominal dam-
ages accrues at the time of the technical breach, the statute does not
begin to run until the sustaining of substantial damage. A technical
breach at the time the -deed is given is usually recognized, but "if the
damages do not then result, it is. misleading and mischievous to treat
this mere technical breach as constituting the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion.' 4 In cases df trespass to land by "seepage" it is held that "owing
to the uncertainty of its course and extent, and the length of time re-
quired after the construction of such properties for it to develop as to
'State v. McClellan, 113 Tenn. 616, 85 S. W. 267 (1905), approved in Aachen
Ins. Co. v. Morton, 156 Fed. 654 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).1oNotes (1933) 86 A. L. R. 524; (1936) 24 CA.Li'. L. REv. 594, 596.
11 Carey v. Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 145 La. 1, 81 So. 734 (1919).
'2 McKimmon 4. Caulk, 170 N. C. 54, 86 S. E. 809 (1915) ; Henofer v. Realty
Loan & Guaranty Co., 178 N. C. 584, 101 S. E. 265 (1919); Note (1894) 39 Am.
St. Rep. 504.
" Bromberg v. Sands, 127 Ala. 411, 30 So. 510 (1900) ; Jett v. Hempstead, 25
Ark. 462 (1867) ; Crissman v. Lee, 132 Ark. 32, 200 S. W. 133 (1918) ; McClurg v.
Hill, 7 Mo. App. 579 (1879); Donahue v. Bragg, 49 Mo. App. 273 (1892); Note(1939) 118 A. L. R. 211.
"4.Seibert v. Bergman, 91 Texas 411, 413, 44 S. W. 63, 64 (1898), quoting from
Post v. Campua, 42 Mich. 90, 94, 3 N. W. 272, 274 (1879) ; In re Hamlin's Estate,
113 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411 (1907).
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its uncertain course and slow stage of career under the ground, depend-
ing on the condition of the earth . .. [a-doption of] the rule that the
statute . . .begins to run from the date the lands were first visibly
affected and injured by the seepage .. .is not only in compliance with
the strict letter of the statute, but a rule which 'will prove the most
equitable, fair and just to all. . . ."15 Finally, and of less importance,
are the lateral support cases, in which the right of action is held not to
accrue until actual displacement of the land.' 0 Although this latter
type of case has been termed the best analogy to follow, 17 it is doubtful
if according to some decisions the analogy is valid, since there is prob-
ably no invasion of the plaintiff's right, no technical breach of duty,
prior to the subsidence itself.' 8
The general exception to the principal rule occurs in cases of the
defendant's "fraud" or "fraudulent concealment" of the right of action,
in which case the running of the statute is tolled until the right of action
or damage is discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have been discovered.' 9 A respectable argument can be advanced for
bringing the present case within this exception, although mere "silence"
has sometimes been deemed insufficient to toll the statute. Some courts
would hold that when the facts are peculiarly and exclusively within
the knowledge of one party and the plaintiff is not in a position to dis-
cover the facts for himself, failure to disclose amounts to active conceal-
ment or fraud.20 A defendant miner's failure to 'disclose his own under-
ground trespass has been held to constitute "constructive fraud".2 A
physician's failure to notify his patient of his negligence in leaving gauze
in an incision was held to be a continuing negligence and "fraudulent
concealment".2 2 In a variety of situations mere non-disclosure has been
" Post v. Campua, 42 Mich. 90, 94, 3 N. W. 272, 274 (1879) (italics supplied).
Herein Judge Cooley intimates (p. 94) that, since damage occurred not at the
time of the technical breach, but years later, enforcement of the rule that claimant's
right of action arose at the time of the technical breach "involves this manifest
absurdity: that the claimant's remedy was barred before he was damnified,-a
result that can scarcely be consistent with any just or proper rule of law."
" Pratt v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909) ; Smith v. Seattle, 18 Wash.
484, 51 Pac. 1057 (1898) ; Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, 11 Eng. Reprint
825 (1861) ; Note (1905) 68 L. R. A. 673.
"7 Darwin, Fraudulent Concealment & Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31 MiCH.
L. REV. 875, 903, n. 82.
" Pratt v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909) ; Rector v. Paterson Ex-
tension Ry., 66 N. J. L. 218, 49 Atl. 1030 (1901).
"9 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §551(1), (2)a; Notes (1934) 23 CALIF. L. REv.
105; (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REV. 366; (1894) 25 L. R. A. 564; (1935) 33 MICH. L.
REv. 839.
" Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 340, 36 L. ed. 82 (1892) ; Farrar
v. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609, 10 Sup. Ct. 771, 34 L. ed. 246 (1890) ; Corry v. Sylvia
Y Cia, 192 Ala. 550, 68 So. 891 (1915) ; Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. App. 825, 163
S. E. 268 (1932) ; HAPER, TORTS (1933) 450.
" Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. United Eastern Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 533, 8 P.
(2d) 449 (1932) ; Lewey v. Fricke Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 Atd. 261 (1895).
" Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S. W. (2d) 503 (1934) ; Bryan v. Aven,
32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S. E. 553 (1924). Justification for both these cases must be
[Vol. 19
NOTES AND COMMENTS
held to bring the case within the "fraud" exception23 in order to pre-
vent individual injustices. Therefore to classify the principal case as
one meriting the invocation of the fraudulent concealment exception
would not violate authority and would establish a less arbitrary standard
of justice to apply in situations similar to the present one.
Suppose, in the instant case, the plaintiff's symptoms had remained
invisible for three years, or the source of the disease unknown to him
for that length of time. Strict application of the rule would have barred
plaintiff from recovery even before the damage or its source was dis-
covered. This rule produces the frequent and unconscionable anomaly
of a plaintiff's right of action having vanished before, as a practical
matter, there could have been a recovery. "The theoretical existence
of a cause of action is of little comfort to a plaintiff who has no actual
knowledge of the operative facts enabling him to bring suit."2" Such a
rule is particularly vicious in malpractice cases, where the plaintiff's
ignorance of his rights may be due to justifiable reliance on assurances
of his physician, and his own lack of technical medical knowledge. As
one judge puts it, "[I] . .. cannot approve a decision whereby a surgeon
can set an agency such as radium in action in the body of a person and
escape liability because it takes more than two years for the dangerous
substance to accomplish the inevitable end, the death of the patient".25
Even if the technical breach is known at the time, making eventual
damage inevitable, still prospective damages are notoriously hard to
prove, and the statutory period may have run before they become suffi-
ciently tangible.26
Besides the two discussed alternatives to the arbitrary result reached
in the principal case-the "fraudulent concealment" exception and the
various analogous cases which might have been followed as precedents-
there is the possibility of -statutory amendment of the rule. Missouri
has adopted a provision which is submitted as a model:
"... Provided, [in civil actions, that] ... the cause of action shall
not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach
found, if at all, in the attempt of the court to dispense. justice in the individual
case, rather than to adhere to a mandatory rule.
' Darwin, Undiscovered Fraud & Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31 MICH. L.
REv. 591, 611, n. 55; Darwin, Fraudulent Concealment & Statutes of Limitation(1933) 31 MICH. L. REv. 875, 918.
2, Note (1937) 35 MIcH. L. REv. 839. The general rule is also criticized in
OPPENHEIMER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1935) 113, where it is said: "... prompt-
ness of action presupposes the knowledge of the existence of conditions which
warrant such action, and it is unreasonable to expect a person to bring suit for
malpractice until he has actual, knowledge of facts which constitute the wrong."
"' Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 46, 54, 58 P. (2d) 475, 480 (1936) (dissent).
"6 Those under disabilities have their right to sue preserved to them until they
become sui juris. Logically, is there any reason why the law should be more so-
licitous of their rights than those of an innocent plaintiff, who, through no fault
of his own, is unaware of his right of action?
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of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is
sustained and capable of ascertainment, and, if more than one item of
damage, then the last item, so that all resulting damage may be discov-
ered, and full and complete relief obtained."2 7
This statute, at least for the purpose of the statute of limitations,
seems to retain no remedy whatsoever for the mere technical breach,28
the right of action being made concurrent with the incidence of damage.
Technical breach gives way to damage as the gist of the action. The
unjust results arrived at by slavish adherence to the old rule are elim-
inated without violating the original purpose of the limitations act. The
Missouri cases interpreting the above provision indicate that it has
achieved the results herein advocated, with perhaps one exception. 29
Louisiana, heir to the French system, has adopted code provisions which
are substantially similar, in effect if not in form, to the Missouri stat-
ute.30 North "Carolina and other states would .do well to follow in these
pioneering footsteps and eliminate, by legislative action, the possibility
of harsh results continuing to flow from an arbitrary application of an
unreasonable rule.
CHAILES EDWIN HINSDALE.
2' Mo. STAT. ANN. §860. The quoted portion 'was added in 1919.
2 Logically, it could not be intended to apply, save for statute of limitation
purposes, to those causes of action, such as trespass to land, where a right to sue
for "nominal" damages is necessary to prevent the acquisition of prescriptive rights.
" Fichtner v. Mohr, 223 Mo. App. 752, 16 S. W. (2d) 739 (1929) ; Strong v.
Frerichs, 116 S. W. (2d) 533 (Mo. App., 1938). The exception occurs in Allison
v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S. W. (2d) 771 (Mo. App., 1933), which seems,
by too strict interpretation, to defeat the very purpose for which the statute was
designed. Plaintiff sustained a severe blow on the nose from swinging machinery,
the bones actually being crushed, but the company doctor told plaintiff at the time
"no damage had been done". Later severe complications set in, but on suit for
damages the court fheld that the right of action accrued at the time of the physical
contact, even though consequential damage had not become certain and substantial
damage making suit feasible had not occured until after the running of the statute.
Aside from this interpretation, the representations of the physician to one entitled
to rely on his assurances, presented grounds for tolling of the statute due to
"fraudulent concealment".
IOLA. CxviL CODE ANN. (Dart, 1932) §3537. Jones v. Texas & P. Ry., 125 La.
542, 51 So. 582 (1910) is an unusual case in which defendant's locomotive collided
with plaintiff's mule, apparently only slight injuries being sustained. Suit was in-
stituted for the slight injuries, but meanwhile the mule, although apparently re-
covered, suddenly died from latent injuries. On a second suit for total damages,
the court declared: "Had the plaintiff brought this suit before the death of the
mule, a complete defense would have been that, for all that was known, the mule
was as valuable as ever, barring flesh wound, -which 'would, doubtless, soon be
healed. Until the fatal nature of the mule's injury revealed itself, therefore, the
plaintiff had no cause of action, and prescription did not run" I Although the case
reaches the desired result, under the statute, the language appears a little am-
biguous, especially since the court admits that a second action for consequential
damages could have been successfully maintained subsequent to the recovery for
the skin injuries.
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Parent and Child-Liability for Torts of Child.
Two recent cases put a heavy strain on North Carolina's common
law rule that "a parent is not liable, merely because of relation, for the
torts of his child, whether the same are negligent or willful."' Bowen
v. Mewborn2 involved an action for willful and lustful assault, with the
parent of the tortfeasor joined as defendant. Upon allegations that he
"had advised and counselled the son.., to indulge in illicit sexual inter-
course" and had thereby "instigated and influenced his said son to
maliciously assault and abuse the plaintiff", and that the son represented
to the plaintiff in his advances upon her that his father "had told him
to do such things", the lower court overruled the father's demurrer. In
reversing this decision the supreme court held that a criminal assault
could not have been, reasonably foreseen from. "such unnatural and
vicious advice", probably given at a remote time in the past, hence the
declaration neither stated a cause of action against the father in negli-
gence, nor one of actual participation in the criminal assault by aiding,
abetting, or counselling his tortfeasor son. In Staples v. Brunso the
plaintiff alleged that he had been run over by defendant's son who was
driving his bicycle upon the city sidewalks with his hands off the handle
bars, in express violation of a municipal ordinance; that the defendant
father knew his son often rode in such a manner yet negligently failed
to either restrain or admonish him; and that defendant employed a negro
attendant to accompany his son, who knew of the boy's habitual viola-
tion of the ordinance and was present at the time of the collision, yet
did nothing to interrupt his criminal course of conduct, negligent per se.
Again reversing the order overruling defendants demurrer, the supreme
court held that "the allegations contained in the complaint are not suf-
ficient to take the plaintiff's case out of the general rule that a parent
is not liable for the torts of his 'minor child."
At the common law a parent was liable for the torts of his child
only on such grounds as would make him liable for the torts of any
other person.4 Thus the parent was liable if he participated in the
tort,5 if the child acted as his agent,6 or if the parent's own negligence
1 CooT.EY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 180. Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 126,
66 S. E. 128 (1909) ; Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ;
Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916). See HARPER, LAW OF TORT
(1933) §619. 2 218 N. C. 423, 11 S. E. (2d) 372 (1940).
'11 S. E. (2d) 460 (N. C. 1940). ' 1 CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 180.
A parent has been held for participation in the child's tort where he: (1) di-
rected the act. Trahan v. Smith, 239 S. W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; (2) con-
sented to its commission. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F. (2d) 641 (N. D. Idaho 1930);
Sharpe v. Williams, 41 Kan. 56, 20 Pac. 497 (1889) ; or (3) ratified it by accept-
ing its benefits. Howell v. Norton, 134 Miss. 616, 99 So. 440 (1924). Although
these cases might well have been decided on the theory of agency, "the courts have
treated them as special bases of liability . . . governed by their own peculiar
principles." HARPER, LAW OF TORT (1933) 623.
' Broadstreet v. Hall, 168 Ind. 192, 80 N. E. 145, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 933 (1907);
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resulted in the commission of the tort by the child.7 And the historic
rule seems to be that the parental relation affords no "strengthening
inferences" s such as will "make the acts of the child any more binding
upon the parent than the acts of any other person".9 However, whether
the basis be participation, agency, or negligence of the parent, there is
a present tendency to enlarge the scope of the parent's liability.10
On the basis of agency the parent is liable for the torts of his child
committed while employed in the parent's business, 1' in the same man-
ner as if the employee were not his child. But a great extension of
liability on an agency basis is to be found in the family automobile
doctrine, which conclusively implies an agency relation whenever a
child with his parent's permission drives an automobile purchased for
family use.12 This doctrine does no slight violence to fundamental rules
of respondeat superior' 8 in creating an agency "more illusory than
substantial". 14 Yet the doctrine has been widely adopted and finds its
raison d'Stre in the justice of holding the owner of a particularly dan-
gerous instrumentality liable for injuries- inflicted thereby by a finan-
cially irresponsible member of his family.15 Save for the fact that
Lemke v. Ady, 159 N. W. 1011 (Iowa 1916); Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C. 203,
90 S. E. 134 (1916) ; Schaeffer v. Osterbring, 67 Wis. 495, 30 N. W. 922 (1886).TBrittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S. E. 128 (1909). See Green v.
Smith, 153 Va. 675, 677, 151 S. E. 282, 283 (1930). HARPER, LAW OF TORT (1933)
622: "This of course is not a case of responsibility of a parent for the child's tort,
but liability for his own"
'Forsythe v. Rexroot, 234 Ky. 173, 27 S. W. (2d) 695 (1930).
Cerchio v. Mullins, 33 Del. 245, 138 Atl. 277, 279 (Del. Super. 1927).1oMADDEN, P SNS AND DOMEsTic RELATioS (1931). Harper and Kime,
Duty to Control Conduct of Another (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 886, 893-895; Notes
(1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 178, (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 643, (1934) 2 DUKE B. A. J. 15,
(1921) 16 ILL. L. REV. 163, (1934) 32 Micir. L. REV. 872.1  HARPER, LAW OF TORT (1933) 619, 620 and cases cited.
" "Under this doctrine the owner of an automobile, which is purchased and
maintained for the pleasure of his or her family, is held liable for injuries inflicted
by his machines while it is being used by members of the family for their own
pleasure." McCall, The Family Automobile (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 256, 263.
Apparently adopted by a majority of American Jurisdictions. 2 BLAsHFInD's
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTomoBiLE LAW (1927) 1464 and cases cited. See Note (1927) 6
N. C. L. REv. 78. Recognized in North Carolina. Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 78,
77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Watts v. Lefler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E. 630 (1925). Recog-
nized in Washington as making a parent liable for injuries inflicted by his nineteen-
year-old son when driving an automobile purchased from his own income. Robinson
v. Ebert, 80 Wash. Dec. 346, 39 P. (2d) 992 (1935).
"'Van Blaricom v. Dodgeson, 220 N. Y. 111, 113, 115 N. E. 443, 444 (1917)
(suggesting that the liability should be sought by legislation). It has been sug-
gested that the courts "seem to start out with the assumption that ... there should
be an agency ... relationship . . . and proceed to find such a relationship in order
to hold the car owner liable." McCall, The, Family Automobile (1930) 8 N. C. L.
REv. 256, 263. See Payne v. Leninger, 160 Minn. 76, 77, 199 N. W. 435, 437 (1924).
Note (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 362 collects legislative solutions of the automobile
problem.
"'Van Blaricom v. Dodgeson, 220 N. Y. 111, 113, 115 N. E. 443, 444 (1917).
15 The Tennessee court observes: "We think that the practical administration
of justice between the parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation
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injuries by means of them are less common little reason appears why the
family purpose doctrine should not be extended to include motorcycles
and bicycles; for they too are (1) classed as potentially dangerous in-
strumentalities, 16 (2) are used upon the highways where the public is
peculiarly exposed to danger, and (3) are capable of inflicting consider-
able damage when driven improperly.17 Such an extension would have
sustained a recovery in the principal, case of Staples v. Bruns.
Similarly, where the basis for liability is participation by the parent,
some cases fall within the ordinary scope of participation, but others
enlarge it. Within the usual bounds of the doctrine appear such cases
as those holding the parent liable for directing his child in the act of
killing plaintiff's hog,'8 for consenting to his son's tort in permitting
him to use the parent's wagon in successive thefts of plaintiff's wood,19
and for assisting his son in an assault upon the plaintiff.20 Ryley v. Laf-
ferty,2' however; indicates an extension of the doctrine of participation.
There defendants knew of their ten-year-old son's vicious disposition to
beat small boys, but refused to restrain or reprove him. In granting
recovery to a victimized child, the court held that the parent's rejection
and resentment of complaints about their son's conduct "would amount
to assent and participation of -the parents in the tort. .... -22 A com-
parable extension was reached in Sharpe v. Williams2 where a parent,
although stating disapproval of a ducking his son and four friends were
planning for their teacher, agreed to pay half of any resulting damages,
provided they would secure the consent of X to pay the rest. The boys
acted without securing X's consent. Judgment was rendered against the
of some esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent." King v.
Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 226, 204 S. W. 296, 298, L. R. A. 1918 F. 293, 296 (1918).
" By a decided majority of the decisions an automobile is not an inherently
dangerous instrument but may become dangerous in the hands of an incompetent.
Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So. 621 (1917) ; Tyree v. Tudor, 183 N. C.
340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922) ; Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919) ;Cohen v. Meador, 119 Va. 429, 89 S. E. 876 (1916). Bicycles, matches, and air
rifles have been similarly classified as potentially dangerous instruments. Steinberg
v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N. Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't 1937) (bicycle);
Highsaw v. Creech, 69 S. W. (2d) 249 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 1933) (air rifle) ;
Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L. Rep. 214, 7 B. R. C. 8, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 582 (1912)(matches). Apparently only one jurisdiction classifies the automobile as an instru-
mentality dangerous in its operation and use, thereby making the owner strictly
liable for its use. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629(1920).
17 These are the arguments of expediency for recognizing the family purpose
doctrine as a matter of "practical justice." See particularly King v. Smythe, 140
Tenn. 267, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918 F 293 (1918). See note 12, supra.18 Trahan v. Smith, 239 S. W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; cf. Harrington v.
Hull, 22 Del. 72, 63 Atl. 875 (1906) ; Smith v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761
(1912). See Note (1930) COL. L. REv. 563.
'1 Beedy v. Reding, 16 Me. 362 (1839).
" See Normington v. Neely, 70 P. (2d) 396, 399 (Idaho, 1937).
2145 F. (2d) 641 (N. D. Idaho 1930). .
2 Id. at p. 644. 2341 Kans. 56, 20 Pac. 497 (1889).
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parent on the ground that he aided and- abetted in the ducking despite
the conditional nature of his approval; that the boys had acted upon his
"suggestion" was held sufficient to render him a participant. A few
courts have labelled as consent and participation a parent's failure to
restrain his child from "continuing in a course of conduct . . . which
is likely to produce injury to others" ;24 although liability for failure to
restrain a child is ordinarily approached in terms of negligence by those
courts which recognize such a duty..5 At least two of these decisions
imply that knowledge of a vicious propensity or disposition may be pre-
sumed from the parental relation alone. 26 Thus those few courts which
hold failure to restrain to be participation might well find participation
in the instant case of Bowen v. Mewborn. For counselling a course of
action goes much farther than failure to restrain it.
A third common basis for parental liability is negligence of the par-
ent. It has been settled that it is negligence for a parent to give a dan-
gerous weapon or an instrument dangerous per se27 to a minor child,
incompetent to handle it because of age, lunacy or intoxication; or, upon
proof that the parent knew of the incompetence of the recipient and
could therefore foresee plaintiff's injury, to give a potentially dangerous
instrument to such a child.28 And numerous decisions have imposed lia-
bility upon a parent for his failure to exercise an exceptionally high de-
gree of care in keeping firearms and other dangerous instruments2
where circumstances make it foreseeable that an infant child may secure
Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 240, 76 N. W. 933, 935 (1898).
25 Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F. (2d) 641 (N. D. Idaho 1930); Davis v. Gavalos, 37
Ga. App. 242, 139 S. E. 577 (1927); Stewart v. Swartz, 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N. W.
719 (1914) ; Kuchlik v. Feuer, 239 App. Div. 338, 267 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1st Dep't
1933) ; Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929).
" Baker v. Holdeman, 24 Mo. 219 (1857) ; cf. Norton v. Payne, 164 Wash. 241,
281 Pac. 991 (1929).
"'Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920) (rifle); Parman v.
Lemnon, 119 Kan. 323, 244 Pac. 227, 44 A. L. R. 1500 (1926) (shotgun); Meers v.
McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62 S. W. 1013 (1901) (giving liquor to minor son with
rifle); Taylor v. Sirl, 120 Wis. 32, 97 N. W. 498 (1903). Same rule applied where
dealer sells cartridges to minor in violation of statute. Binford v. Johnston, 82
Ind. 427, 42 Am. Rep. 508 (1882). Contra: Clarine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310,
234 N. W. 295 (1931) (no liability in absence of evidence that it was unsafe for
defendant to intrust child with a gun) ; Herndobler v. Ripperm, 75 Ore. 22, 146 Pac.
140 (1912) ; Misch v. Montgomery, 200 Atl. 1003 (R. I. 1938). See Notes (1921)
12 A. L. R. 812, (1926) 44 A. L. R. 1509.
11 Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So. 621, L. R. A. 1917 F 380 (1917);
Broadstreet v. Hall, 168 Ind. 192, 80 N. E. 145, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 933 (1907)
(velocipede); Robertson v. Aldridge, 185 N. C. 292, 116 S. E. 742 (1923) ; Arch-
ibald v. Jewell, 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 247 (1918) (air gun) ; Hopkins v. Droppers, 184
W-is. 400, 198 N. W. 738, 36 A. L. R. 1156 (1924) ; Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont.
L. Rep. 211, 7 B. R. C. 8, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 582 (1911). HARPrm, LAw OF TORT(1933) 622. See Note (1924) 36 A. L. R. 1164.
" Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356, 12 A. L. R. 809 (1920);
Whitesides v. Wheeler, 158 Ky. 121, 164 S. W. 335, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1104(1914) ; Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S. E. 128 (1909); Salisbury v.
Crudale, 41 R. I. 33, 102 Atl. 731 (1918).
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them and negligently inflict injury. But a few courts rule that in neither
of the above situations would a parent be liable for injury willfully in-
flicted by the child,30 there being a strong presumption that one cannot
foresee the willful act of another. However, a parent is liable for the
willful injuries inflicted by such an instrument intrusted to his child,
when the parent might foresee such an act through his knowledge of a
vicious propensity of the child,31 or when the general demented and ma-
lignant disposition3 2 of the child affords him notice. In all of these in-
stances the parental liability is based on personal affirmative acts of
negligence, jusf as if no parental relation existed-defendant's parent-
hood presumably affording no strengthening inferences of negligence.
A strong contingent of the courts now recognize in the parent an
affirmative legal duty to "perform definite acts to control the child when
he should recognize that such control is necessary to prevent the
child's injuring third persons."33 Thus a parent has been held negligent
in failing (1) to take from his child a potentially dangerous instrument
from which injury to others can be reasonably foreseen.;3 4 (2) to re-
strain a child with a known vicious propensity from exercising it to the
injury of the public;35 (3) to interfere with a particular use of a not
inherently dangerous instrument when such use threatens injury to oth-
ers ;s6 and (4) to interfere with a child's known habit or course of con-
duct which threatens to do damage.3 7 And in exceptional cases it has
"Halsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S. E. 664 (1932) (long-bladed
knife given to fifteen-year-old son) ; Haggerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac. 622,
56 Am. Rep. 101 (1885) (suggests that parent is not liable unless agency or
participation is alleged). Contra: Sousa v. Irome, 219 Mass. 273, 106 N. E. 998
(1914).
"' Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N. E. 334 (1928) (propensity
of child to shoot gun recklessly) ; Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933
(1898); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929) (seven-year-old
child's propensity to strike playmates with sticks) ; Hoverson v. Noker, 60 Wis.
511, 19 N. W. 382 (1884) ; Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L. Rep. 211, 7 B. R. C. 8,
Ann. Cas. 1912 A 582 (1912) (giving matches to child known to have propensity
to play with them recklessly).
2 Capps v. Carpenter, 129 Kans. 462, 283 Pac. 655 (1929) ; cf. Paul v. Hummel,
43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381 (1868). See Note (1930) 78 U. o PA. L. REv. 1032.
"Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 245, 281 Pac. 991, 992 (1929). Compare
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) 858: "A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally -harming others
or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his child, and (b) knows or should.know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control."
" Gudziewski v. Stempleski, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N. E. 334 (1928) ; Johnson v.
Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933 (1898) ; Hoverson v. Noker, 60 Wis. 511, 19
N. W. 382 (1884). See Note (1929) 23 ILL. L. Rxv. 830.
" Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F. (2d) 641 (N. D. Idaho 1930) ; Kuchlik v. Feuer,
239 App. Div. 338, 267 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1st Dep't 1933); Norton v. Payne, 154
Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1928). See Notes (1930) 30 COL. L. Rav. 269, (1931)
17 CORN. L. Q. 178, (1930) 15 IoWA L. Rav. 507, (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv' 627.
".Stewart v. Swartz, 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N. E. 719 (1914) (parent knew
that child had stretched rope swing across highway).
"' Davis v. Gavalos, 37 Ga. App. 242, 139 S. E. 577 (1922).
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been suggested that a parent might be under a duty to curb a child's
vicious or demented disposition by which the public has in the past and
may in the future be harmed.88 Obviously each of these cases recognizes
a duty peculiar to parenthood and as such represents a departure from
the strict common law rule.
A few early decisions defined a parent's duty to restrain his child in
terms of the broad doctrine that "he who does not prevent a wrong when
he is able to do so ratifies it",. 9 thereby placing upon the parent a duty
to prevent those torts of his child which he could specifically foresee.
Generally, however, the courts have refused to adopt such a rule, pre-
ferring to retain the common law definitions and develop the law of
parental liability by expanding these definitions to meet the exigencies
of individual cases. 40 But if failure to restrain a child is negligence,
either by application of the broad rule or by the noted exceptions to the
common law doctrine, recovery could have been allowed in each of the
principal cases. For there is an obvious failure to restrain in Staples v.
Bruns; and in Bowen v. Mewborn the parent's conduct was the active
negligence of advising a child to commit an act from whicf injury could
be foreseen. 4 '
There is considerable authority for holding a parent liable for failure
to restrain a child from committing criminal acts which constitute negli-
gence per se.42 Thus a parent is deemed negligent in permitting his
child to drive an automobile or motorcycle in violation of the statutory
age limit.48 And Davis v. GavaloS4 4 imposed liability for just such an
omission as was the alleged cause of action in the instant case of Staples
v. Bruns, permitting a child to ride a velocipede upon the sidewalks at
8 Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381 (1868) (parent not liable for
son's assault with knife unless she knew of his "vicious disposition and habits") ;
Cluthe v. Svendsen, 9 Dec. Rep. 458 (Ohio 1885) (father not liable for assault of
demented and dangerous son unless aware of his condition and knowingly per-
mitting him to be at large and unwatched) ; Salisbury v. Crudale, 41 R. I. 33, 102
Atl. 731 (1918). See Haunert v. Speier, 214 Ky. 46, 281 S. W. 998, 999 (1926).
" Beedy v. Reding, 16 Me. 362 (1839) ; cf. Dunks v. Grey, 3 Fed. 862 (C. C.
E. D. Pa. 1880) (parent cited for contempt for permitting son, manager in business
for which defendant was salesman, to sell certain patented articles which defendant
had been enjoined from selling).0 Smith v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761 (1912) ; cf. Elms v. Flick, 100
Ohio St. 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1920). See especially note 10, supra.
4" That participation of a parent in the tort of the child may constitute positive
negligence is the theory of at least two cases. Ryley v. Lafferty, 43 F. (2d) 641(N. D. Idaho 1930); Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933 (1898).
Criticized in Note (1931) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 178, 179.
42 Paschall v. Sharp, 110 So. 387 (Ala. 1926) ; Eller v. Dent, 203 N. C. 439, 166
S. E. 330 (1932); Miller v. Semler, 137 Ore. 610, 2 P. (2d) 233 (1931).
"Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 198 N. W. 738, 36 A. L. R. 1156 (1924).
"37 Ga. App. 242, 139 S. E. 577 (1922). Contra: Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249
App. Div. 518, 293 N. Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't 1937) (strong dissent to effect that:
"when a child uses an instrument having potentiality for harm to others when
unlawfully used and such use is unrestrained by parents, who have knowledge of
such use, the responsibility . . . should be borne by the parents . .. ").
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night in direct violation of a municipal ordinance. In Bowen v. Mew-
born a criminal act was not merely unrestrained but counselled.
Thus under liberal expansions of well-known doctrines both of the
principal cases might have been decided otherwise. It may be objected
that in Bowen v. Mewborn the father did not counsel the particular
crime committed. True, but his counsel could have been carried out
only by the commission of some crime, such as fornication, adultery, or
rape. Should not the father's liability extend to the crimes included
within the scope of his perverted advice? Should he escape liability be-
cause he did not know which crime the son would select, nor the person
whom he would offend?
The Anglo-American legal system, in withholding parental liability
for torts of children, stands opposed to many other legal systems which
impose liability45 on the theory that ". . . paternal responsibility for
torts is the consequence of paternal authority. '49 Neither extreme is.
desirable. Early cases in Louisiana evidence the injustice of holding a
parent liable for the torts of his child regardless of his incapacity to
prevent them.47 And a strict application of the common law rule is
manifestly more unjust to society than is the Louisiana rule to the par-
ent, since it requires a class absolutely powerless to command, restrain,
or correct a child to assume responsibility for its torts. A tempting so-
lution is offered by the French Code which holds a parent liable for the
torts of his child unless he "should prove that [he] could not prevent the
act which gives rise to his liability". 48 For no injustice would be per-
petrated by requiring a parent to prove that he has properly exercised
his exclusive parental authority to restrain, correct, or advise his child
against committing a tort which can be foreseen. But if adoption of the
rule of the French Code is not likely by reason of the stubborn nature
" See Notes (1920) 14 ILL. L. REv. 648, (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 202.
" Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 325, 93 So. 108, 110 (1922).
' The Louisiana Revised Civil Code, Art. 2318, providing that "the father, or
after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their
minor or unemancipated children residing with them . . . ", omits the restriction
placed upon parental liability by the French Code (see note 48, infra). Early de-
cisions in Louisiana ruled that this omission was intended "to make the liability of
the parent absolute. . . " Johnson v. Butterworth, 152 So. 166, 168 (La. App.
1934). But much injustice was perpetrated by this doctrine. Mullins v. Blaise, 37
La. Ann. 92, 44 La. 59 (1885) ; Sutton v. Champayne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917)
("It seems illogical and hard that a mother should be liable in damages for the
consequences of the act of somebody else in intrusting a dangerous weapon to her
inexperienced child out of her presence and without her knowledge.") And in
Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934) (reversing Johnson v.
Butterworth, 152 So. 166 (La. App. 1934)) the Louisiana Supreme Court by
judicial construction ruled that a parent is only liable for the torts of his minor
son when the parent is himself negligent. See Notes (1934) 19 CoRe. L. Q. 643,
(1932) 7 TULANE L. REv. 119. For comparable statutes in other jurisdictions see
Notes (1891) 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 944, (1931) 17 CoRe. L. Q. 178, 179, n. 5.
," FRENCH CIV. CODE (Cachard's Tr. 1930) Art. 1384. See Johnson v. Butter-
worth, 180 La. 586, 589, 157 So. 121, 123 (1934).
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of our existing views, at least liberalization along the lines already
marked out in other jurisdictions should go forward in North Carolina.
V. LAMAR GUDGER.
Procedure-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Validity of Rule 35a-
Physical and Mental Examination of Persons.
The United States Supreme Court in a recent case1 upheld rule 35a2
of the New Federal Rules of Procedure which provides for physical and
mental examination of a party whose condition is in controversy. The
petitioner sued for personal injuries. Respondent denied the allegations
of the complaint, and moved for an order requiring the petitioner to
submit to a physical examination by a court-appointed physician to de-
termine the nature and extent of her injuries. The court gave the order
and when compliance was refused, committed her for contempt. Plain-
tiff contended that the court was without power to enter the order, since
rule 35a was invalid as contrary to the provision of the Enabling Act a
that "said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substan-
tive rights of any litigant." The circuit court of appeals 4 affirmed the
conviction and on appeal it was Held: The contempt order was improper
but the rule was valid. It was also stated that any of the provisions
set out in rule 375 might have been used to enforce the order.
Petitioner admitted that the rule was procedural, for to have con-
tended that it was substantive would have meant that the state rule
would have been applied.7 But it was argued that by the prohibition
against abridging substantive rights, congress intended "substantive" to
mean "important" or "substantial" rights. The court rejected this argu-
ment saying that the test must be whether the rules really regulate
procedure. It was pointed out that adoption of the suggested criterion
would result in endless confusion.
The cases of Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford8 and Camden and
Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, 61 Sup. Ct. 422, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 349 (1941).
'35a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938), "In an action in which
the mental or -physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court . . . may
order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician."
'48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. 723b (1941).
'108 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
'Rule 37 (b) (2) (i), (ii), (iii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1938).
"South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901); Lake Erie &
W. R. R. v. Griswold, 72 Ind. App. 265, 125 N. E. 783 (1920).
'Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188
(1937).
8141 U. S. 250, 11 Sup. Ct. 1000, 35 L. ed. 734 (1890). Action for injuries by
concussion of the brain; order requiring the plaintiff to submit to an examination in
a proper manner reversed althoughthe defendant alleged that he had no other
evidence of the plaintiff's condition. The plaintiff's person is to be maintained
inviolate, and no inspection can be compelled.
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Suburban Railway v. Stetson9 decided the federal courts lacked inherent
power to order physical examination of a party. Therefore, the prob-
lem in the instant case was whether the federal courts had been given
this power by statute. There is no question but that a statute may
grant such a power.'o The question is, did the Enabling Act together
with the rules promulgated thereunder grant such a power?
It is well settled that congress may delegate to the courts power to
enact rules of procedure,"1 and that when such rules are thus enacted
they have the same force and effect as statutes. Obviously, however,
the rules enacted must fall within the scope of the authority granted.12
The court in the present case traced the history of the rules and found
that the rule was within the scope of the Enabling Act. Four justices
dissented on the ground that the rule was not within this scope. They
contended that the Botsford case should have been followed in the ab-
sence of an express statute by congress as the rule was too radical a
departure from existing practice.' 3
Thus the federal courts have at last reached by this rule the same
result that a majority of the state courts14 have heretofore held to be an
' 177 U. S. 172, 20 Sup. Ct. 617, 44 L. ed. 721 (1899). Botsford case approved,
but here the New Jersey law allowing compulsory examination was held applicable
to a federal trial there. There was no state law in the Botsford case.
" Ibid., and also see McGovern v. Hope, 63 N. J. L. 76, 42 Atl. 830 (Sup. Ct.,
1899); Lyon v. Manhattan Ry., 142 N. Y. 298, 32 N. E. 113, 25 L. R. A. 402(1894).
' Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253 (U. S. 1825); Beers V.
Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 9 L. ed. 145 (U. S. 1835).1 Barresueta v. Sword Steamship Line, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 935 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Vassar v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 29 F. Supp. 968(W. D. Okla. 1939).13 This specific rule was attacked and defended before the committees of the
two Houses. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rep., 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 117, 141; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary, U. S. Sen., 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 36-37, 39, 51.
" Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. 90 (1880) ; Sibley v. Smith, 46
Ark. 275 (1885); Johnston v. Southern Pacific Co., 150 Cal. 535, 89 Pac. 348(1907) ;'Western Glass Mfg. Co. v. Schoeninger, 42 Colo. 357, 94 Pac. 342 (1908) ;
Cook v. Miller, 103 Conn. 267, 130 Ad. 571 (1925); Richmond & D. R. R. v.Childress, 82 Ga. 719, 9 S. E. 602 (1889) ; South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60
N. E. 271 (1901); Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 47 Iowa 375 (1877)(leading and often quoted case); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Thul, 29 Kan.
466 (1883) ; Belt Electric Line Co. v. Allen, 102 Ky. 551, 44 S. W. 89 (1898) ;
United Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Cloman, 107 Md. 681, 69 Atl. 379 (1908); Graves v.
Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 54 N. W. 757 (1893) ; Wanek v. Winona, 78 Minn. 98,
80 N. W. 851 (1899); Shepard v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 85 Mo. 629 (1885); State
ex rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 152 N. W. 748 (1915) ; Flythe v. Eastern
Carolina Coach Co., 195 N. C. 777, 143 S. E. 865 (1928); Brown v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry., 12 N. D. 61, 95 N. W. 153 (1903) ; M. & M. Turnpike Co. v. Bailey,
37 Ohio St. 104 (1881) ; Carnine v. Tibbets, 158 Ore. 51, 74 P. (2d) 974 (1937) ;
Cohen v. Phila. Rapid Tr. Co., 250 Pa. 15, 95 Atl. 315 (1915); Williams v. Chat-
tanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S. W. 1031 (1915); Lane v. Spokane
Falls & N. Ry., 21 Wash. 119, 57 Pac. 367 (1899) ; White v. Milwaukee City Ry.,
61 Wis. 536, 21 N. W. 524 (1884). See Murphy v. Southern Pac. Co., 31 Nev. 120.
142, 101 Pac. 322, 331 (1926) ; Tugman v. R. & D. R. Cotton Mills, 144 Va. 473,-
495, 132 S. E. 179, 185 (1926). For further cases and extended discussion see
WIGMNORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §2220, note 13.
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inherent power of the court. Generally four reasons have been assigned
for the majority view: (1) A party to an action should have the right
to demand that all evidence within the control of the court be produced,
where it is essential to the attainment of exact justice, and the needs of
justice should outweigh any notions of delicacy which might arise in
this situation.15 (2) A plaintiff who brings an action impliedly agrees
to disclose any information necessary for the accomplishment of com-
plete justice. 6 (3) Since the plaintiff is privileged to exhibit his injuries
to the court or jury for the purpose of showing their nature and extent,
the court ought to have the power for the same purpose to require him
to do So.17 (4) Since a court has power in annulment suits, where
impotence is alleged, to order an examination of a party by a doctor
appointed by the court, the court should have the same power in per-
sonal injury cases, in order to protect the defendant against possible
fraud.18 This last reason has had long standing in the English courts.' 9
The minority view seems to have resulted from a lack of precedent
in common law civil actions and failure to recognize a need for this
procedure in spite of the increasing popularity of the personal injury
action. Considerations of personal liberty have been regarded as more
important than the good to be accomplished from a court made rule;
and further, these courts feel that any great need will be made manifest
by appropriate legislative action.20  Indeed, eight states have expressly
conferred the power by legislation where it has been -denied by the
court.
21
11 South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901) ; Wanek v. Winona,
78 Minn. 98, 80 N. W. 851 (1898); Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 47
Iowa 375 (1877).
" Richmond & D. R. R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719, 9 S. E. 602 (1889) ; Graves v.
Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 54 N. W. 757 (1893) ; White v. Milwaukee City Ry.,
61 Wis. 536, 21 N. W. 524 (1884).
"
7Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 47 Iowa 375 (1877); see also
Brewer, J., dissenting in Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 259, 11
Sup. Ct. 1000, 1004, 35 L. ed. 734, 740 (1890).isAlabama G. S. Ry. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. 90 (1890) ; Cook v. Miller, 103
Conn. 267, 130 Ad. 571 (1925); Wanek v. Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 80 N. W. 851(1899).
" WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §2220 (6).
" Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill. 254, 77 N. E. 583 (1906) ; Stack v. New York,
New Haven and Hartford R. R., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 686 (1900) ; Yazoo &
M. V. 1. R. v. Robinson, 107 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914) ; Atchison, T. & S. F.
R. R. v. Melson, 40 Okla. 1, 134 Pac. 120 (1913); Easier v. R. R., 60 S. C. 117,
38 S. E. 258 (1901); Austin & N. W. R. R. v. Cluck, (Tex. Civ. App.) 73 S. W.
569 (1903). See Kennedy v. New Orleans R. & L. R. 142 La. 879, 883, 77 So.
777, 778 (1918).
Wigmore severely criticises the attitude of the minority by asking this question:
"Why is it that courts have to be perpetually pricked into progress by jabs of
legislative operations on judicial procedure, instead of spontaneously making their
own improvements in their own constitutional fields?" He also extends this
criticism to -restrictive interpretations of power and of legislative sanction given
by some of the majority courts to this problem. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940) §2220(6).
" Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island
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The language of the federal rule is broad, but there is no) indication
in the present case as to what limits the court may place on it in future
construction. It has been decided by a lower federal court 2 that a
motion in a libel suit for any order to require the plaintiff to be ex-
amined should be overruled. The action was based on statements that
the plaintiff was suffering from various physical and mental conditions.
Truth was alleged as a 'defense. The court said the physical and mental
conditions in question were not immediately in controversy; they were
incidental and collateral. Historically, it was pointed out, this type of
law has dealt with personal injury cases. This holding is questionable.
Doesn't the issue of a statement relating to one's condition put that
condition in controversy?
Another question recently decided by the circuit court of appeals 23
is whether, under this rule, a mother and child may be compelled to
submit to a blood grouping test in a suit in which paternity is an issue.
Three things have to be found before the rule is complied with in this
instance. (1) That the physical condition of the mother is "in con-
troversy". The court pointed out that the defendant offered his denial
of paternity in support of the demand for blood tests and the plaintiff
asserted his paternity and thereby denied by necessary implication, that
the blood groupings which were in question were or might be incon-
sistent with it. That conflict brought the groupings "in controversy".
(2) That the blood test is properly within the term "physical condition".
The court answered this by saying that the characteristics of one's
blood is as much a part of "physical condition" as congenital blindness,
or any other condition existing from birth. (3) That the child is a
party to the action. Although the child is not a party in form it cer-
tainly is one in substance. The interests of mother and child do not
conflict but rather merge in a common interest. Provision is made in
the rules for suit by.the child and, further, said the court, rule 17 (a)2 4
provides "a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought."
Thus it would seem that a blood test in this type of case should come
within the rule. Blood tests have been recognized sufficiently in scien-
tific circles to be of great benefit in the courts when they are properly
applied.25
and South Dakota. Washington also has a statute but the court has reached the
same result prior to its enactment.
22 Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W. D. Mo. 1939), noted in (1938) 34
ILL. L. REv. 103.
"Beach v. Beach, 114 F. (2d) 479, noted in (1940) 29 GEo. L. J. 114.
"Rule 17 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure- (1938).
"WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§165a, b, 2220; Britt, Blood Grouping
Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag" (1937) 21 MINN. L. Rav. 836.
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State statutes, with one notable exception,2" and decisions are con-
fined to personal injury actions. However, within the confines of the
personal injury action the state courts have been liberal in their orders
as to the scope of the examinations. The more recent cases generally
hold that a reasonable examination includes a physical examination,
X-rays, 27 blood test 28 and a test of the urine, feces, or sputum. 2 If
the examination may imperil the plaintiff's health, cause serious pain, or
require an anaesthetic, the court may refuse to order it.30 There are at
present no decisions on this element of the problem under the federal
rule but it is to be hoped that the federal courts will adopt the liberal
attitude which. the language of the rule warrants.
A unique feature of the federal rule, not found in the state decisions
or statutes, is the provision for mutuality of disclosure. This is secured
by the requirement that if the party examined requests and obtains the
physician's report of the examination ordered by the court, he must, on
request, give the other party a report of any other examination which
has been or may be made relevant to the same mental or physical con-
dition.3 1 Also, the rule provides that by requesting and obtaining the
physician's report the party waives any privilege he may have regarding
the testimony of any other person who has examined or may examine
him. -32
Federal rule 37 makes adequate provision for enforcement of rule
35. Where a party refuses to obey an order for an examination the
court may under rule 37 (b) (2) (i) "Issue an order that the examina-
tion . . . be taken to be established . . . in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order," or (ii) "Issue an order.., prohibiting
the disobedient party from introducing evidence of physical or mental
condition," or (iii) "Issue an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dis-
missing the action, or rendering judgment by default against the dis-
obedient party."
The federal courts are expressly prohibited from issuing a contempt
order in this instance. 33 This is permitted in some of the state courts
2 South Dakota- Code 1939, 36.0602-36.0604. This statute is practically identical
with the Federal Rule.27 Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 236 App. Div. 804, 259 N. Y. Supp. 597
(2d Dep't 1932). See Depfer v. Walker, 123 Fla. 862, 866, 169 So. 660, 662 (1935).2
'Hoyt v. Brewster, Gordon & Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dep't 1921), noted in (1921) 31 YALz L. J. 664.
" See Depfer v. Walker, 123 Fla. 862, 866, 169 So. 660, 662 (1935) ; Cleveland
St Ry. v. Huddleston, 151 Ind. 540, 545, 46 N. E. 678, 680 (1897).
" Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 177 Ky. 698, 198 S. W. 54 (1917);
Grill v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 243 App. Div. 853, 278 N. Y. Supp. 775 (4th
Dep't 1935) ; Andrus v. Fomfara, 3 N. J. Misc. 261, 127 AtI. 788 (Sup. Ct., 1925).1 Rule 35 (b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938).
82 Rule 35 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938).
" Rule 37 (b) (2) (iv) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938).
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on the theory that this is the normal manner of enforcing an order of
the court.3 4 However, by the procedure most widely adopted the court
will abate the proceeding until the examination is made, and if the
plaintiff refuses to submit, will either dismiss the action or enter a
judgment non pros.35
There are two cases in North Carolina on the point of physical ex-
amination. The first3 6 held that where the plaintiff exhibited an injury
to the jury that defendant had the right to have the injury examined
by an expert in the jury's presence and the extent of examination was
in the discretion of the trial judge. This situation is to be distinguished
from the present problem. In this instance exhibition to the jury of an
injury by the plaintiff constituted a waiver and as a matter of right the
defendant may-have a physician appointed to make an examination in
the jury's presence. In the second case3 7 defendant moved, after the
jury had, been impanelled, for an order requiring plaintiff to submit
to an X-ray examination by an expert appointed by the court. The
motion was refused and on appeal this was upheld. However, the court
was careful to point out that power to compel such an examination is
an inherent power of the court which should be left to the discretion of
the trial judge. There was found to be no abuse of discretion in this
instance because the motion was not seasonably made. The motion
should have been made before the trial term.
The prevailing practice in this state has been to allow a motion for
physical examination where it is seasonably made. Frequently attorneys
agree, thus making a motion unnecessary. Defendant's attorney often
has a pow-rful impellent where he refuses to consider settlement of a
case until an examination is had. No cases appear in the North Car-
olina reports of an order for physical or mental examination in other
than personal injury cases. There would seem to be a need for a statute
in this state if the procedure is to be extended to other types of cases.
ROBERT CRAIG McINNEs.
Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Malpractice-Burden of Proof
Plaintiff recovered judgment for injuries allegedly sustained from
negligence of defendant surgeons in leaving a gauze sponge buried in
her hip. Defendants appealed contending that their motion for nonsuit
was improperly refused, because (1) res ipsa loquitur has no applica-
tion to the facts of the case,'and (2) even if applicable, the presumption
"See Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I .& P. R. R., 47 Iowa 375, 381 (1877).
"Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 Atl. 30 (1927) ; Williams 'v.
Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenm. 683, 176 S. W. 1031 (1915) ; Lane v. Spokane
Falls & N. Ry., 21 Wash. 119, 57 Pac. 367 (1899).
" Fleming v. Holman. 190 N. C. 449, 130 S. E. 171 (1925).
" Flythe v. Eastern Carolina Coach Co., 195 N. C. 777, 143 S. E. 865 (1928).
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of negligence raised by it is fully met when upon trial an adequate ex-
planation is given with regard to the matter and the facts made fully
known (defendants having introduced evidence that great care had
been exercised in the usual and customary manner to prevent leaving
any sponges in the wound.) Held, affirmed; motion for nonsuit properly
denied.'
The application of res ipsa loquitur2 to malpractice cases is limited.
It may not be invoked merely because a patient is not cured or aggra-
vation follows treatment, for common experience teaches that cure is
never certain and aggravation is possible even though proper care is
used.3 A doctor is neither a warrantor of cures nor an insurer.4 Where
reasonable doubt exists as to the proper treatment to pursue, no infer-
ence of negligence is ordinarily raised from honest mistakes or errors
in judgment.5 Put broadly, a physician or surgeon is held to "the requi-
site degree of learning, skill and ability necessary to, the practice of his
profession, and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess,"
and must apply those faculties with ordinary care and diligence in
every case.8 To recover for default in these respects, specific acts of
negligence must be established. 7 Liability may attach even for errors
in judgment if so gross as to contravene the requisite norm of skill and
diligence.8
However, as said in the principal decision, "... there should be no
reasonable argument against the availability of the doctrine [res ipsa]
in medical and surgical cases involving negligence, just as in other
negligence cases, where the thing which caused the injury does not
Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C 178, 13 S. E. (2d) 242 (1941).
'The doctrine asserts that "Whenever a thing which produced an injury is
shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant, and the
occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care
has been exercised, the fact of injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evi-
dence to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant
tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care." White v. Hines,
182 N. C. 275, 287, 109 S. E. 31, 37 (1921) ; Harris v. Mangum, 183 N. C. 235,
238, 111 S. E. 177, 178 (1922) ; Ridge v. R. R., 167 N. C. 510, 518, 83 S. E. 762,
766 (1914). The maxim literally means, "The thing speaks for itself." The injured
party is deemed in no position to explain the cause while the party charged, having
more favorable opportunity, is in a position to explain and show himself free from
negligence if such be the case. If the plaintiff has equal knowledge or superior
means of information, the doctrine does not apply. Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1494,
1495.
'Note (1930) 26 ILL. L. REv. 350.
' Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932) ; Davis v. Pittman,
212 N. C. 680, 194 S. E. 97 (1937).
'Brewer v. Ring, 177 N. C. 476, 99 S. E. 358 (1919) ; Thornburg v. Long, 178
N. C. 589, 101 S. E. 99 (1919).
SMullinax v. Hord, 174 N. C. 607, 611, 94 S. E. 426, 428 (1917); Nash v.
Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 416, 127 S. E. 356, 360 (1925).
Ferguson v. Glenn, 201 N. C. 128, 159 S. E. 5 (1931) ; Michem v. James, 213
N . C. 673, 197 S. E. 127 (1938).
N ash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925).
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happen in the ordinary course of things, where proper care is exer-
cised." 9 In the great majority of states, the doctrine is commonly ap-
plied to situations where a surgeon leaves in the body of his patient a
foreign substance that causes injury or, damage. 10 Previously the North
Carolina Court has applied res ipsa loquitur where metal probes were
left in the pleural cavity of a patient,11 and where glass was passed
from patient's womb some time after operation thereon.1 2 These prece-
dents furnish clear support for the principal decision.
Recently, the North Carolina Court stated that res ipsa might be
applied in any case where the result reached was "grotesquely contrary
to all human experience."'1 The potentialities of this formula are un-
predictable, yet no wide extension seems presaged. Res ipsa loquitur
will not be invoked: "(1) Where more than one inference can be drawn
from the evidence as to the cause of the injury ;14 (2) where the exist-
ence of negligent default is not the more reasonable probability, and
where the proof of the occurrence, without more, leaves the matter
resting only in conjecture; (3) where the injury results from accident
as defined and contemplated by law.'
15
Although the plaintiff need show no actual negligence, he must of-
fer a minimum of circumstantial evidence, sufficient to convince the
'Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 182, 13 S. E. (2d) 242, 245 (1941).110 Note (1930) 65 A. L. R. 1023. For fact situations in other jurisdictions, see
Notes (1940) 28 GEo. L. J. 708, (1931) 26 IL. L. REv. 350, (1929) 3 So. CAL.
L. REv. 131, (1930) 64 U. S. L. REv. 608, (1928) 14 VA. L. REV. 490.
" Blaine v. Lyle, 213 N. C. 529, 196 S. E. 833 (1938) ; cf. Smith v. McClung,
201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931).
' Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932).
"Covington v. James, 214 N. C. 71, 197 S. E. 701 (1938) (where patient's leg,
after being set, was allowed to abcess, swell, and burst and then to twist in such a
manner that it became practically useless).
14 Taken literally this statement that if the situation presents more than one
inference the doctrine is inapplicable, seems directly contradicted by the fact that
our courts hold that the doctrine when applicable presents a two inference situation
to tho jury. (See quotation from Womble v. Grocery Co., p. 00.) However, this
seeming conflict may be reconcilable if we assume that the court means to permit
only one inference as to the actual physical cause of the injury, while two in-
ferences are permissible to the jury, not as to the cause of the injury, but as.to
the negligence of the defendant (i.e. either he was or he was not negligent). (For
examples of cases wherein more than one inference could be drawn as to the
physical cause of the injury, see note 15, infra.)
"Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931), citing Springs v.
Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251 (1929). Possibly illustrative examples are:
(1) Lippard v. Johnson, 215 N. C. 384, 1 S. E. (2d) 889 (1939) (since allergy
and the varying conditions of human systems make the reaction of a particular
person to a specific drug in large measure unpredictable, res ipsa liquitur did not
apply to raising of blister and black tissue after injection of novocain for local
anesthetic.) (2) McLeod v. Hicks, 203 N. C. 130, 164 S., E. 617 (1932) (res ipsa
improper .where patient lost his eye through deterioration some three years after
an incision for the removal of a cataract made at the proper place and in the proper
manner, there being evidence that disease pre-existed the operation and caused the
loss of the eye.) (3) Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931) (held
not a rer ipsa situation where novocain" needle in. hands of dentist broke off in the
patient's gum).
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judge that the jury is entitled to consider whether the defendant has
acted as a reasonably prudent man. Assuming res ipsa applicable, there
arises the controverted problem of its weight before the jury. Authority
divides in three directions: (1) an inference of negligence, so that the
jury may, but are not required to, find that the defendant was negli-
gent; (2) a rebuttable presumption of law of negligence so that the
jury is required to find for the plaintiff in the absence of any explana-
tion, thereby shifting to the defendant the burden of going forward
with the evidence; (3) a burden of proof,. in the strictest sense, placed
upon the defendant to convince the jury that he was free from
negligence.'0
It is not unusual to find res ipsa given each'of these three effects
within a single jurisdiction, without any adequate analysis of the prob-
lem involved. North Carolina, however, has steadfastly clung to the
first view which, although giving the doctrine the least effect, is con-
sidered by the majority of the courts to be the most reasonable solution
of the problem.17 Thus, in Womble v. Grocery Co.,'8 it was said that
"res ipsa loquitur . . . carries the question of negligence to the jury,
not relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proof, and not . . . raising
any presumption in his favor, but simply entitling the jury, in view of
all the circumstances and conditions, as shown by the plaintiff's evi-
dence, to infer negligence. . . ." Again, in White v. Hines:19 "In some
of our decisions the expressions res ipsa loquitur, prima facie evidence,
prima facie case, and presumption of negligence have been used as
practically synonymous. As thus used, each expression signifies noth-
ing more than evidence to be considered by the jury." After the plain-
tiff makes out such a prima facie case, the burden of going forward
with the evidence is said to shift to the defendant, but only in the
sense that his practical chances of winning lie in such action rather than
in inertly risking an adverse verdict, and not that any literal burden
of proof is shifted to him.20 Viewed in this light, the principal decision
seems but an affirmance of principles already laid down .21
" Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22
ILL..L. REV. 724, 730 (containing a review of states applying the different views) ;
HARPER, TORTS (1933) §77. For additional citations of jurisdictions applying each
type of effect, see 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §2509, n. 2; Carpenter,
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur1 in California (1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. REv. 166,
171; Notes (1932) 12 CALIF. L. Rsv. 138, (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV. 173, (1931) 80
U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 311, (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1494.
" The United States Supreme Court, in Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33
Sup. Ct. 416, 57 L. ed. 815 (1912) adopted this view and specifically approved the
North Carolina cases. See Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1494.
18 135 N. C. 474, 485, 47 S. E.,493, 497 (1904).
2' 182 N. C. 275, 288, 109 S. E. 31, 38 (1921).2 Harris v. Mangum, 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177 (1922).
21 For additional citation of authority in this state, see Note (1928) 53 A. L. R.
1494, 1511.
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It is notable, however, that three justices only concurred in the ma-
jority opinion, not being in accord with all that was said as to the
presumptive effect of the doctrine.2 2 Yet their citation of authority
apparently bears out the majority opinion, with the exception of a
suggestion that the defendant might explain away the plaintiff's prima
facie case by evidence that the injury was not due to his want of care.23
Thus, the concurring opinion intimates that the majority attribute too
much weight to res ipsa loquitur, and is perhaps attempting to leave
room in the future, should a proper occasion arise, to nonsuit the
plaintiff. True, the general rule in North Carolina is that on a motion
for nonsuit the evidence of the defendant, unless favorable to the plain-
tiff, is not to be taken into consideration, except that evidence not in
conflict with the plaintiff's testimony may be used to explain or amplify
that which has been offered by the plaintiff.24 However, there are
reasonable grounds for urging that if a case should arise in which the
defendant does not contradict the plaintiff's evidence, but by unim-
peached testimony explains away the basis of his prima facie case of
res ipsa loquitur, a nonsuit might be granted. Some authorities so
hold.25
Nevertheless, the majority view in the instant case probably ex-
presses the weight of authority. "The credibility of the explanation
and its sufficiency were questions for the jury and the prima fade case
of the plaintiff is not necessarily overthrown by uncontradicted evidence
that the appliances were constructed and operated in a proper manner."26
Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 184, 13 S. E. (2d) 242, 246 (1941).
"20 Am. JuR. 215; 20 R. C. L. 187.
,Funeral Home v. Ins. Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. (2d) 820 (1939), and cases
cited.
%So, in Stott v. Power Co., 47 Cal. App. 242, 190 Pac. 478, 479 (1920), it was
said in reversing a refusal of nonsuit "In cases where the bare circumstances of
an occurrence as to the cause of which negligence is charged'are shown, if a de-
fendant by uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that he has used the degree of
care required of him in the circumstances, the plaintiff must fail of recovery." In
Mattox v. Woolworth Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 489, 47 Pac. (2d) 805 (1935), it was
said that the trial court might direct a verdict if the occurrence is satisfactorily
explained so as to show lack of negligence on the part of defendant. In Ryder v.
Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94 (1895), the falling of a wall, injuring plaintiff,
was said to raise a prima facie presumption, in the absence of explanatory circum-
stances. Yet the court said that where such explanatory circumstances are given
in evidence, and the cause of the fall of the building is established, and there is
nothing in the evidence tending to connect such cause with the owner's negligence,
the burden rests on the party asserting such negligence to establish lack of ordinary
care. See also Lawson v. Electric Co., 204 Ala. .318, 85 So. 257 (1920) ; and High-
land v. Ins. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 Pac. (2d) 631 (1932).
" Warren v. Tel. Co., 196 Mo. App. 549, 556, 196 S5. W. 1030, 1033 (1917). In
Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 67, 50 S. E. 562, 565 (1905), it was said that
"The proof in this case does not disclose any distinct act of negligence on the part
of defendant, nor does it show any specific defect in the elevator [which felli....
But the evidence must be submitted to the jury, because the rule of res ipsa loqidlur
gives the plaintiff the advantage of a footing in the case or of a basis for recov-
ery and calls for proof from the defendant." See also Kohner v. Traction Co.,
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In view of the relative disposition of authority and the apparent:
insufficient explanation"- offered by the defendant, the disposal of tht
instant case may be accepted as correct. However, the concurring
opinion is commendable in keeping alive the suggestion made in Turner
v. Power Co.,2 8 that although the application of res ipsa loquitur is not
displaced by testimony which, if accepted by the jury, would exonerate
the defendant since the credibility of the evidence is for the jury, still
"There may be cases where the explanation offered .. . is so full and
satisfactory that a court would be justified in charging the jury, 'If
they believe the evidence, the defendants are entitled to their verdict.' "129
Though there is some likelihood that the concurring justices might in
an appropriate case desire to go even further and accept the viewpoint
of the minority, taking the credibility as well as the weight of the evi-
dlence away from the jury, and directing a verdict for defendant.8 0
HARVEY A. JONAS, JR.
Trial-Courts-Evidence-Trial Judge's Destruction
of Stenographer's Notes.
At the April 14th (1941) term of the Superior Court of Mecklen-
burg County, plaintiff contractor entered suit against the Carolinas
branch of the Associated General Contractors of America and eleven
individual contractors for damages occasioned -by his expulsion from
22 App. D. C. 181, 189, 62 L. R. A. 875, 877 (1903), where it is said: "Unless ...
we are to adopt the theory that the plaintiff's prima facie case only lasts until
the defendant has offered some explanation, and that such explanation, whether
true or false, destroys the presumption of negligence raised by the plaintiff's
proof, and casts upon the plaintiff the necessity of proving by additional testimony
in rebuttal that, notwithstanding the explanation, there was in fact negligence
... there is no escape from the conclusion that the case must be submitted to a
jury. But we find no warrant in, reason or in adjudicated cases for such a the-
ory.. . . It does not follow that, because an explanation is sufficient in law,
therefore it is true; nor does it follow that, because it is true, it is sufficient to
exonerate the defendant. The explanation may be true as far as it goes, and
yet it may not be sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence raised
from the circumstances of the accident." To the same effect, the court, in
Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker, 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 453 (1908), said
"Nor is the fact that the defendant, in cases of this character, may introduce
direct evidence conducing to establish that there was no negligence ...sufficient
to warrant the court in taking the case from the jury, as the jury might infer,
notwithstanding this evidence, that there was negligence."
"7 Since by the general rule it is not sufficient for the physician or surgeon
to show merely that he acted according to the usual and ordinarily approved
methods. Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 394, 166 S. E. 285, 290 (1932).
28154 N. C. 131, 69 S. E. 767 (1910). 2.Id. at 139,69 S. E. at 770.
20 Of course, under no circumstances would the North Carolina court direct
a verdict for the plaintiff, since he carries the burden of proof under the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Our court has established an absolute rule that a
verdict may never be directed in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof,
since the judge is forbidden to comment on the weight of the evidence. McIN-
e- _ oRTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROceDURE (1929) §574.
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the association and certain alleged activities of individuals which im-
paired his business. Defendants set up a counterclaim for sums alleg-
qdly misappropriated by plaintiff from the association. At the close of
plaintiff's evidence, defendants' motion for nonsuit was allowed; and
in the judgment as finally signed and consented to, there was incor-
porated an agreement by the parties not to institute any further suit
against one another on account of any matters set forth in the complaint
or counterclaim.
Apparently feeling that appeal and further suit were effectually pre-
cluded by this judgment, the presiding judge requested that all the
stenotype notes on the evidence given at trial be turned over to him
to be destroyed and that no transcript of them be made. His reason
for so -doing appears from his statement reportedly made at the time:
"I want all these men to patch up their differences, go on about their
work peacefully, forget about all this stuff and not continue to argue
and antagonize about it in the future."'
Assuming that the stenographer's notes at this stage of trial are at
least an inchoate part of the record,2 some measure of control over them
would seem to be sanctioned by those cases which hold that the judge
has an inherent power of control over the record-which power must
be exercised with discretion.3 In those cases, however, none of which
have gone so far as to say. that the judge may summarily destroy the
entire minutes of trial, the question arises where there is the possibility
of an appeal or perhaps a further suit by the original parties. No case
has been found which directly defines the court's power over the stenog-
rapher's notes where further litigation between the parties is precluded.
For purposes of the particular litigation, they are apparently no longer
useful, although in some subsequent action they might become important
in determining what had there been decided.
These notes may become pertinent, however, where the evidence sug-
gests the propriety of an investigation of a public nature or a possible
prosecution for perjury. The testimony in the present case, for ex-
ample, strongly implied the prevalence of certain lobbying and contract-
' Loftis v. Carolinas Branch of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America et al., News
and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), April 26, 1941, p. 1.
- See generally Cressler v. Asheville, 138 N. C. 482, 51 S. E. 53 (1905).
'See, for example, Gow v. Dubuque County, 213 Iowa 92, 94, 238 N. W. 578,
579 (1931) ("the records of -the trial court are peculiarly within the control of
that court . . "). An early New York case contains the following language:
"Assuming the power of the court to remove its records from the clerk's office.
for the purpose of destruction, it is apparent that it is a power to be exercised
with the greatest caution, and only in the most exceptional cases. Of course,
affidavits and documents not properly part of the records of the court, and filed
by mistake, would properly be directed to be removed. So, also, the court should
not suffer its records to be used to publish libels, and scandalous accusations
wholly irrelevant to the cause should be suppressed." Schecker v. Woolsey. 2
App. Div. 52, 37 N. Y. Supp. 292, 293 (2d Dep't 1896)
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ing practices of a doubtful character, offensive to expressed public
policy. 4 It is submitted that a judge should not be extended the power
to destroy the only available record of such evidence which, because of
the solemn circumstances under which it was obtained, may not only
afford the best beginning point for a healthy investigation, but may also
serve as convincing evidence in a later prosecution. Indeed, the duty
should be enjoined upon the judge, as a part of his obligations to his
office and to the public, to apprise the proper officers where such sug-
gestive testimony is given.5 Since a judgment of the type rendered in
this case prevents further suit by the parties, destruction of the stenog-
rapher's notes could add little to the permanency or peacefulness of the
settlement. It contributes greatly, however, to the difficulty of discov-
ering and suppressing illegal practices which are peculiarly elusive.
E. H. SEAWELL.
'Matter which courts strike from their files as "scandalous" usually gets in
by way of the briefs or pleadings, and is of an apparently different nature from
the matter involved here. "Scandal", for these purposes, -has been defined as "an
unnecessary statement which bears cruelly upon the moral character of an indi-
vidual, or the statement of anything which is contrary to good manners, or any-
thing which is unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear." Nadeau v. Texas
Co., 104 Mont. 558, 575, 69 P. (2d) 586, 595 (1937). See collection of cases in
Note (1937) 111 A. L. R. 879.
' See News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), April 26, 1941, editorial entitled
"When the 'Not Serious' is Very Serious"; also id., April 25, 1941, editorial
entitled "No Longer Private Quarrel".
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